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Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst
Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III

ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, which struck down Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme, altered the Court’s Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. That doctrine
has undergone several important changes since it was first recognized. At times the doctrine has
expanded, invalidating sentencing practices across the country, and at times it has contracted,
allowing restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion based on findings that are not submitted
to a jury. Hurst represents another expansion of the doctrine. Although the precise scope of
the decision is unclear, the most sensible reading of Hurst suggests that any finding required
before a judge may impose a higher sentence must first be submitted to a jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. This reading invalidates several state capital sentencing systems and
several noncapital systems, and it would require dramatic changes to federal sentencing as well.
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INTRODUCTION
In its 2016 decision, Hurst v. Florida,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Florida’s capital sentencing system violated the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.2 Although the opinion purports to routinely apply the Court’s
previous Sixth Amendment cases, a closer examination of Hurst shows that it
expanded the doctrine. The Court struck down Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme because it conditioned the imposition of the death penalty on findings
made by a judge, even though a jury had already made the same findings. But
the Court’s previous Sixth Amendment cases seemingly permitted such judicial
factfinding when made subsequent to similar jury findings.
This is not the first time that the Supreme Court has expanded its Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine without explicitly acknowledging that it was
doing so. In Ring v. Arizona,3 decided in 2002, the Court invalidated Arizona’s
capital sentencing scheme.4 Ring claimed to simply apply existing doctrine, and
because only a handful of states employed similar capital schemes, the case
initially seemed relatively unimportant. But the decision in Ring actually
modified the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine, and that modification
proved momentous. Using the slightly modified Ring rule, the Supreme Court
invalidated both the mandatory application of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the noncapital sentencing regimes in multiple states within
three years.5
History may be repeating itself. Although the holding in Hurst applied
only to the Florida death penalty scheme—and very few states have similar
capital sentencing schemes—the manner in which Hurst broadened the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine may ultimately have wide-ranging effects in
both capital and noncapital cases.
In particular, Hurst makes clear that mere “authorization” of a sentence by
a jury does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment.6 Prior to Hurst, several
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
Id. at 624.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Id. at 609.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the mandatory
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment); Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that mandatory state sentencing guidelines
violate the Sixth Amendment).
As explained below, a statute “authorizes” a sentence when the sentence is available under
the statute. But mere authorization is not enough where certain facts serve as statutory
prerequisites to the imposition of the sentence. See infra Part III.
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sentencing systems distinguished between factual findings that authorize or
make a defendant eligible for a sentencing increase, and other findings required
to impose a sentence. Several courts have held that only those findings that
“authorize” a sentence need be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; a judge could make other findings by using a preponderance
of the evidence standard.7 Hurst rejects this authorization approach to the
Sixth Amendment. Instead, Hurst requires that a jury—as opposed to a
judge—make all factual findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, necessary for the
imposition of the sentence.
In addition, Hurst may have expanded the category of findings that trigger
the Sixth Amendment. Prior to Hurst, the Court had intimated that Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine applied only to findings of historical fact.8
But language in Hurst suggests that juries must also make qualitative
determinations, such as the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, when those determinations are necessary for the imposition of
particular sentences. Like Hurst’s rejection of “authorization,” an expansion of
the Sixth Amendment to qualitative findings would affect many sentencing
systems across the country. A number of states require judges to weigh
aggravating and mitigating facts or make other qualitative findings before
increasing punishment.9 Hurst suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires
juries to perform those tasks instead.
This Article explores the wide-ranging consequences of Hurst on
sentencing in the United States. It identifies the capital and noncapital sentencing
systems that Hurst appears to invalidate—a list that is quite long. But this
Article does more than simply identify the practical consequences of Hurst. It
also explains how Hurst’s expansion of the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine improves the doctrine—a doctrine that has been in a state of nearconstant flux since 2000.10 Those fluctuations stem, in part, from the Court’s

7.

8.

9.
10.

See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 625 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc); State v. Gales, 658
N.W.2d 604, 612–13 (Neb. 2003). It is worth noting that judicial factfinding typically
requires a lower standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) than jury factfinding
(beyond a reasonable doubt).
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (stating that, under the Sixth Amendment, capital defendants “are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment” (emphasis added)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)).
See infra Subpart IV.A (cataloguing these states).
There is a robust literature that addresses the wide-ranging consequences of Apprendi v.
New Jersey and the subsequent expansions and contractions of the Sixth Amendment. See,
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struggle to accommodate various considerations, including history, formalism,
and the values that underlie the right to a jury trial. Hurst strikes a balance
between these competing concerns, and it does so in a manner that is both
sensible and administrable. That is because Hurst makes judicial sentencing
discretion the touchstone of the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. There
is no jury right for findings that a judge makes of her own accord; the right
exists only if the finding is required before the imposition of a sentence.
To be sure, Hurst does not explicitly acknowledge this expansion. Just as
Ring purported to simply apply existing doctrine,11 so too the opinion in Hurst
describes the decision as a straightforward application of Ring to Florida’s
capital sentencing regime.12 But that cannot be the case. Ring only required juries
to make findings that were necessary to increase punishment; it was silent
about requiring judges to make additional findings, and subsequent cases
appeared to permit such judicial findings.13 If Hurst merely applied Ring, then
Florida did not violate Timothy Hurst’s Sixth Amendment rights because he
had a jury finding that authorized the imposition of the death penalty.14 As
explained below, the only sensible way to read Hurst is as an expansion of the
Sixth Amendment’s scope from factual findings that authorize sentencing
increases to all factual findings required to impose a higher sentence.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine before Hurst, and it describes how
Hurst expanded the doctrine. Part II explains that, after Hurst, a jury must
make all factual findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, that are required in order
to impose a higher sentence. This reading rejects any constitutional distinction

11.
12.
13.
14.

e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195 (2005)
(exploring whether the Apprendi line of cases is best understood as a blunder); Stephanos
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110
YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (discussing the likely effect of the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine on defendants who plead guilty); Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the
Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010) (criticizing the Sixth Amendment sentencing cases); Nancy J.
King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467 (2001); Jonathan S.
Masur, Booker Reconsidered, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091 (2010) (using a dissent by Judge
Easterbrook to critique Booker).
See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016) (“We granted certiorari to resolve whether
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring. We
hold that it does, and reverse.” (citation omitted)).
See infra text accompanying notes 115–117.
At least, the death penalty was “authorized” in the sense that the word “authorized” has
been used by courts applying the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. See infra text
accompanying notes 149–150, 196–197, 202–203.
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between factual findings that “authorize” a sentence and factual findings that
are required to impose a sentence. Hurst also suggests that the jury right applies
not only to findings of historical fact, but also to other required findings,
including qualitative determinations. Part II explains how these doctrinal
expansions are grounded not only in the formalist logic of Hurst, but also in
larger principles about the role of the jury and about the role of judicial
discretion that appear both inside and outside of the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine.
Parts III and IV drill down on these two expansions, explaining how Hurst
supports each of these rules, identifying those sentencing systems that run afoul
of each rule, and addressing counterarguments to adopting these rules in the
wake of Hurst. Part III addresses the expansion of the Sixth Amendment from
factual findings that “authorize” a sentence to all factual findings that are
required to impose a sentence. Part IV addresses the possibility that Hurst
expanded the Sixth Amendment from findings of historical fact to all required
findings, including qualitative determinations.
I.

HURST AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING DOCTRINE

To understand Hurst and how it has shifted Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine, it is necessary to explore briefly the genesis of the doctrine and its
evolution. This Part traces the rise of the doctrine, as well as its various
expansions and contractions. Then, it demonstrates why Hurst did more than
simply apply Ring.
A.

The Rise of the Sixth Amendment Sentencing Doctrine

In 1999, the Supreme Court first suggested that the Sixth Amendment
placed restrictions on sentencing practices in Jones v. United States.15 Jones
involved the proper interpretation of the federal carjacking statute. The statute
provided for higher maximum sentences if various aggravating circumstances
were present, such as inflicting serious bodily injury.16 The Jones Court had to
decide whether those aggravating circumstances constituted elements for
separate crimes or whether they were mere sentencing enhancements to be

15.

16.

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999) (“[D]iminishment of the jury’s significance
by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range would resonate
with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet
settled.”).
18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) (2018).
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decided by the judge.17 The Court interpreted the statute as setting forth
separate crimes, and it relied, in part, on the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance.18 According to the Jones Court, interpreting the statute as
establishing sentencing enhancements, rather than separate crimes with
different elements, “would merit Sixth Amendment concern.”19 Allowing
states to characterize elements of crimes as sentencing enhancements would let
legislatures remove from juries the determination of whether a defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a given element. It would reallocate that
determination to judges, who need only find that element occurred by a
preponderance of the evidence.20
The same issue arose the following year in Apprendi v. New Jersey.21
Apprendi involved a New Jersey statute that increased the maximum penalty
for crimes committed “with a purpose to intimidate . . . because of race, color,
gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”22 The New Jersey
Supreme Court interpreted the statute as setting forth a sentencing
enhancement, rather than as creating a separate crime.23 Because it was a
sentencing enhancement, the New Jersey court reasoned that the trial court
need only make the finding of intimidation by a preponderance of the
evidence.24 This state court interpretation forced the U.S. Supreme Court to
answer definitively whether the Sixth Amendment prohibited judges from
making such findings by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Apprendi Court held that the Sixth Amendment jury right did, in fact,
prohibit judges from making such findings. Specifically, the Court held that
any fact that increases the statutory maximum penalty for a crime must be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.25 The Court based its

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

526 U.S. at 230–32.
Id. at 239–40. The canon of constitutional avoidance prefers the Court to decide cases on
nonconstitutional grounds as opposed to constitutional ones when possible. For a
discussion of the doctrine and an example of its application, see William W. Berry III,
Criminal Constitutional Avoidance, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (2014).
Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975) (applying Winship to Maine’s heat of passion law).
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44–3(e) (West Supp. 1999–2000) (repealed 2001).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471–73.
Id. at 468–69, 471–73.
Id. at 490. The Court recognized an exception for prior convictions, which is discussed in
more detail infra text accompanying note 163.
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decision on the importance of the jury trial right, which serves as a check on state
power, as well as on the history of juries and punishment in the United States.26
Because the Court limited the rule announced in Apprendi to increases in
statutory maximum sentences, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine did
not appear to affect many structured sentencing guideline practices in the
United States. Structured sentencing arose in the last quarter of the twentieth
century in response to perceptions that broad statutory sentencing ranges gave
judges too much power to impose dramatically different sentences on
defendants who had committed similar crimes.27 In order to combat
sentencing disparity, a number of states and the federal government adopted
legislative or administrative schemes that limited judicial sentencing authority
to narrow bands within statutory ranges, based on a judge’s factual findings at
sentencing.28 Because the Court framed Apprendi’s rule in terms of increasing
the maximum statutory sentences, these structured sentencing practices
appeared constitutional in the wake of Apprendi.
But Ring v. Arizona29 expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine
beyond statutory maxima. Ring involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to
Arizona’s capital sentencing regime. Arizona convicted Timothy Ring of firstdegree murder, and the statutory maximum punishment for murder was the
death penalty. Arizona law permitted the imposition of the death penalty only
if certain aggravating circumstances were present, and Arizona assigned the
task of finding those aggravating circumstances to the trial judge, not a jury.30
The Ring Court held that this sentencing scheme violated the Sixth
Amendment. Even though the maximum punishment for first-degree murder
specified in the statute was death—thus satisfying the rule articulated in
Apprendi—the Court focused on the maximum penalty that Ring could receive
based on his conviction alone, which was life imprisonment.31 Unless and until
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.
31.

530 U.S. at 476–90.
See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) (explaining this shift as part of the shift from penal
welfarism to penal populism); Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a
Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 169–73 (2016) (describing the rise of structured
sentencing).
See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69 (1999); Kevin R. Reitz,
Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State
Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997); see also infra notes 103–108 and accompanying
text.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
See id. at 592–93 (describing the Arizona capital sentencing system).
See id. at 597 (“Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony
murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprisonment.”).
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the judge found an aggravating circumstance, the judge could not sentence
Ring to death. And this, according to the Ring Court, violated the Sixth
Amendment.32 For the sentence to be constitutional, the jury had to find the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.33
Notably, the Ring Court framed its holding narrowly: that the Sixth
Amendment prohibits “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”34
And it explained its holding as nothing more than an application of Apprendi to
capital cases.35 When the Court decided Ring, only four other states—Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska—had similar capital sentencing schemes.36
Initially, the Ring decision’s effect seemed to be modest. But in applying
Apprendi’s rule to something more than a straightforward increase of a
statutory maximum penalty, Ring had dramatically expanded the scope of the
doctrine to other forms of structured sentencing.37
Two years later, in Blakely v. Washington,38 the Court, citing Ring,
acknowledged this expansion of the doctrine: “Our precedents make clear,
however, that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”39 By expanding the Sixth Amendment to
apply to factual findings that a jury must make before the judge has the
authority to increase a sentence, Ring invalidated many of the structured
guideline sentencing systems that were thought to have survived Apprendi.40
Within a year of deciding Blakely, the Supreme Court used the expanded Sixth

32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 589, 609 (framing the decision as a mere acknowledgment that Apprendi was
“irreconcilable” with a previous decision upholding Arizona’s capital system) (“Capital
defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment.”).
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (2001) (providing for a similar scheme, but employing a
three-judge panel)); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1997);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
See JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 322 (2016) (stating that Ring clarified that
Apprendi was not “a drafting rule” and, as a result, “Ring would prove to be the intellectual
forebear of Blakely”).
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Id. at 303 (alteration in original).
PFAFF, supra note 37, at 328 (“[T]he outcome in Blakely was inevitable given the Court’s
holding in Ring.”).
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Amendment sentencing doctrine to invalidate mandatory application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as well.41
But the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has not expanded in an
unbroken line. The doctrine has experienced several contractions. For
example, in Harris v. United States,42 the Court refused to apply the doctrine to
statutes that imposed mandatory minimum sentences.43 In Oregon v. Ice,44 the
Court held that the U.S. Constitution did not prohibit states from assigning the
findings of fact necessary for the imposition of consecutive sentences for
multiple offenses to the judge, rather than the jury.45 Most notably, in applying
the Sixth Amendment doctrine to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court
has repeatedly permitted some restrictions on federal judges’ ability to increase
sentences in the absence of factual findings, suggesting that not all factual findings
required to increase a defendant’s sentence trigger the Sixth Amendment.46
But the Court has also expanded the doctrine in the years since Ring. In
Southern Union v. United States,47 the Court extended the doctrine to criminal
fines.48 Most notably, in Alleyne v. United States,49 the Court overruled Harris
and held that the Sixth Amendment applied not only to findings that increased
the maximum available punishment, but also to findings that imposed
mandatory minimum punishments.50
These expansions and contractions illustrate that the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine is still in flux. Sometimes, the Court explicitly acknowledges
a contraction or expansion in the case that establishes it.51 But other times, it

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the mandatory
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment).
536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
Id. at 548.
555 U.S. 160 (2009).
Id. at 169–70, 172. Many commenters have argued that the holding in Ice is entirely
incompatible with the rules announced in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely. See, e.g., PFAFF,
supra note 37, at 368–70 (stating that Ice is entirely inconsistent with Ring and Blakely);
Bowman, supra note 10, at 455–58 (criticizing the analysis in Ice as “little more than a
compilation of the arguments rejected by the majority opinions in Apprendi, Blakely, and
Cunningham”).
See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 66 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. at 230–32. The
Court’s decisions about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have triggered a near-avalanche
of critical commentary. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate
Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, The
Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665 (2006).
567 U.S. 343 (2012).
Id. at 360.
570 U.S. 99 (2013).
See id. at 103.
See, e.g., id. (explicitly overruling Harris).
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has altered the doctrine without acknowledging the shift until subsequent
cases.52 As the next Subpart explains, Hurst appears to fall into this second
category. Just as the rule announced in Apprendi could not fully explain the
outcome in Ring, the rule announced in Ring cannot fully explain the outcome
in Hurst.
B.

Reading Hurst

Timothy Lee Hurst received a death sentence in Florida for murdering his
coworker, Cynthia Harrison.53 Authorities found Harrison’s body in the
freezer of the restaurant where she worked—bound, gagged, and stabbed over
sixty times.54 The jury found Hurst guilty and recommended a death
sentence.55 Under Florida law, the trial judge was required to hold a separate
hearing to determine whether “sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to
justify imposing the death penalty.”56 The trial judge reached the same
conclusion as the jury and sentenced Hurst to death.57
Hurst challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that Florida’s sentencing
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, he asserted that his
sentence ran afoul of Ring v. Arizona,58 because a jury, not a judge, must find
the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. The Florida Supreme
Court affirmed his sentence, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had
previously upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing system.59
In particular, the Florida Supreme Court relied on Hildwin v. Florida,60 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Amendment “does not
require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

This happened not only in Ring, see supra text accompanying notes 34–37, but also in
Booker, which did not acknowledge all of the restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion
that the new advisory system imposed until later cases. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 49–50, 50 n.6 (2007).
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. Because of an error, the Florida Supreme Court initially reversed the sentence. At
resentencing, the jury again issued its advisory verdict of death, and the judge again found
the facts necessary to sentence Hurst to death. See id. at 620.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
See Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435, 445–47, 449 (Fla. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); see
also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640–41 (1989), overruled by Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616
(upholding Florida’s capital statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1976)
(same).
490 U.S. 638 (1989) overruled by Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616.
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death be made by the jury.”61 The Florida court noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court never overruled Hildwin in its post–Apprendi cases.62
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that Hurst’s sentence violated the
Sixth Amendment, and it overruled Hildwin and other prior cases “to the extent
they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent
of a jury’s factfinding, that is necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”63
At first glance, Hurst reads as a simple application of Ring. Indeed, much
language in the majority opinion supports this reading.64 For example, the
majority states:

61.
62.
63.

64.

Id. at 640–41.
Hurst, 147 So.3d at 446–47. The Court decided Hildwin more than a decade before its
embrace of the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine in Apprendi.
Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but on the grounds that
judicial sentencing in a capital case violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 624 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the Court should revisit
Ring, and further, should not extend it to Hurst because Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme was distinguishable from the Arizona scheme struck down in Ring. Id. at 625–26
(Alito, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion begins by explaining that, although a jury recommended a death
sentence for Hurst, “Florida law required the judge to hold a separate hearing and
determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the
death penalty.” Id. at 619 (majority opinion). After this description, the Court
pronounced: “We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional. The Sixth Amendment
requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A
jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” Id.
Notably, every time that the Hurst majority referenced the case’s holding, it always
framed the holding in terms of the imposition of capital punishment. See, e.g., id. (“The
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a
sentence of death.”); id. at 622 (“As with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment
Timothy Hurst could have received without any judge-made findings was life in prison
without parole. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s authorized punishment based on
her own factfinding. In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sentence violates the Sixth
Amendment.”); id. at 624 (“Time and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of
Spaziano and Hildwin. The decisions are overruled to the extent they allow a sentencing
judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”); id. (“The Sixth Amendment protects a
defendant’s right to an impartial jury. This right required Florida to base Timothy Hurst’s
death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding. Florida’s sentencing scheme,
which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is
therefore unconstitutional.”).
In light of this framing, one might argue that the holding in Hurst applies only to capital
sentencing proceedings. But such an argument is almost certainly wrong. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that capital defendants are entitled to certain
rights that are not guaranteed to defendants who are not facing the death penalty, see, e.g.,
Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1149–62 (2009)
(describing heightened Eighth Amendment scrutiny in capital cases), the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right is not one of those rights. And the Supreme Court has always
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As with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment Timothy Hurst
could have received without any judge-made findings was life in
prison without parole. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst’s
authorized punishment based on her own factfinding. In light of
Ring, we hold that Hurst’s sentence violates the Sixth
Amendment.65

But there are features of Florida’s capital sentencing statute that are
difficult to square with the holding in Ring. The Florida jury made only a
recommendation to the sentencing judge, and regardless of what sentence the
jury recommended, the judge was free to make her own sentencing decision.66

65.
66.

applied the Sixth Amendment sentencing rule that it first articulated in Apprendi—that a
court cannot increase a punishment for a crime unless the fact that increases the
punishment is submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt—to capital and
noncapital defendants alike. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (“Capital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment.”). Also, if the holding in Hurst had been limited to death penalty
cases, then Justice Breyer presumably would have joined the majority opinion rather than
concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer’s concurrence was based on his view that “the
Eighth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a
defendant to death.” Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)).
Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (majority opinion).
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1)–(3) (2015). The relevant text read:
(1)
SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF PENALTY.—Upon
conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by
s. 775.082 . . .
(2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY.—After hearing all the evidence,
the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based
upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in
subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the
aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced
to life imprisonment or death.
(3)
FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH.—
Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court,
after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a
sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of
death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death
is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in
subsection (5), and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances. In each case in which the court imposes the death
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A judge could impose a death sentence when a jury recommended life in
prison, and she could impose a life sentence when the jury recommended
death.67 The jury’s advisory sentence did not determine which sentence the
judge imposed; rather, it was whether the judge could find that “sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist[ed],” as enumerated in the relevant statute,
and that “there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances.”68 The statute classified these findings as “facts.”69
If Timothy Hurst’s jury had recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment, there is no question that his death sentence would have violated
the rule from Ring. If the finding of one or more facts is necessary to increase a
sentence, then a jury must find those facts, not a judge.70 But Timothy Hurst’s
jury did not recommend life imprisonment. The jury recommended death,
and so the sentence did not implicate those features of the Florida statute that
were in tension with Ring.
The jury in Hurst found at least one aggravating fact and recommended a
sentence of death.71 The judge reached the same conclusion.72 If Hurst were
merely about a right to a jury finding a certain fact, one would expect the Court
to have held that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in the case because
the jury made the relevant factual finding with respect to Timothy Hurst. And
the fact that others might face an unconstitutional sentence—because the
statute permits a judge to impose a death sentence without a jury finding of an
aggravating factor—would not have been a basis for Hurst to prevail, as the

sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by specific written
findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and
upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. If the court does
not make the findings requiring the death sentence within 30 days after the
rendition of the judgment and sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life
imprisonment in accordance with s. 775.082.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 602 (2002).
Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622.
After the jury convicted Hurst, the trial judge held a separate sentencing proceeding for the
jury to sentence Hurst. During that sentencing proceeding, the jury was asked to provide a
sentencing recommendation to the judge, and the jury was instructed that it could return a
recommendation of death only if it found at least one aggravating sentencing factor
beyond a reasonable doubt and if it also found that the aggravating sentencing factors were
not outweighed by mitigating factors. Hurst’s jury recommended death by a vote of seven
to five.
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Court will generally not hear constitutional challenges in cases that do not
themselves raise a constitutional problem.73
In arguing to affirm Hurst’s death sentence, Florida emphasized that the
jury had recommended the death sentence, and that the recommendation
necessarily reflected a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, which was necessary
to impose the higher punishment.74 But the Hurst Court dismissed the jury’s
finding of an aggravating circumstance as irrelevant. Rather than directly
addressing the factual finding by a jury, the Hurst Court instead focused on
how the statute authorized capital punishment:
The State fails to appreciate the central and singular role the judge
plays under Florida law. As described above and by the Florida
Supreme Court, the Florida sentencing statute does not make a
defendant eligible for death until “findings by the court that such
person shall be punished by death.” The trial court alone must find
“the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and
“[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances.” “[T]he jury’s function under the
Florida death penalty statute is advisory only.” The State cannot
now treat the advisory recommendation by the jury as the
necessary factual finding that Ring requires.75

What mattered was not whether a jury had actually made the factual
finding, but rather that the statute permitted imposition of the death penalty
only after a judge made the same factual finding and found that mitigating
evidence did not outweigh aggravating evidence.76 In other words, the Court
rejected the idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees only that certain facts
be found by a jury; instead, what matters is whether the statute requires a judge
make any factual findings before the sentence can actually be imposed.
Importantly, Hurst’s victory was not because the Florida system permitted
judges to impose the death penalty without a jury finding that an aggravating

73.

74.
75.
76.

See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (“[T]his Court has
generally insisted that parties rely only on constitutional rights which are personal to
themselves.”); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
450 (2008) (stating that the Court will not “‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it’” nor “‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” (quoting Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
See Brief for Respondent at 15, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No. 14-7505)
(“Hurst received a death sentence only after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt at
least one aggravating circumstance. He thus received all Ring could require.”).
Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 619 (“We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)).
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factor existed—that is, in those cases where the jury recommended life. Hurst’s
jury did not recommend life; it found the presence of at least one aggravating
factor and recommended a death sentence. The Hurst Court could not have
granted Timothy Hurst relief on the basis that the Florida statute violated the
rights of other criminal defendants.77
One might argue that, even though Hurst had a jury finding, his sentence
nonetheless violated the Sixth Amendment because of the breakdown of the
jury vote in his case. The jury recommended death by a vote of 7 to 5.78 While
previous Supreme Court decisions make clear that the Sixth Amendment jury
right does not require unanimity, there is uncertainty about whether
determinations in criminal cases made by a simple majority are constitutional.79
Indeed, Hurst argued that a 7 to 5 jury determination does not satisfy the Sixth
Amendment.80 The Hurst Court, however, did not address the issue of jury
breakdown in its opinion. If Hurst’s rights were violated because only a bare
majority of jurors found an aggravating factor, one would expect the Court to
have resolved the case on those relatively straightforward grounds. But instead,
the Court left open the question whether a simple majority can satisfy the Sixth
Amendment. Thus, the Court’s decision in Hurst rests on a different Sixth
Amendment problem—whether a state can require judges to make findings
before permitting the imposition of the death penalty.81

77.
78.
79.

80.
81.

See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (noting “the general rule that a
person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on
the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others”).
Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622.
See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). In
Apodaca, the Court upheld Oregon’s “ten of twelve” juror rule with respect to state
prosecutions, even though it found that federal cases required unanimity. In a companion
case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the Court similarly upheld a 9–3 jury
outcome. The Court’s decisions, though, emphasized that constitutional problems could
arise if states moved toward simple majorities. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362 (majority opinion
emphasizing that nine jurors was enough and a “substantial majority” is to be convinced);
id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring in both cases) (“[A] system employing a 7–5 standard,
rather than a 9–3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great difficulty.”).
See Brief for Petitioner at 36–51, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No. 14-7505).
Alternatively, one might argue that Hurst’s rights were violated because the jury did not
indicate which aggravating factor they found as a basis for their death penalty
recommendation. That leaves open the possibility that a majority of jurors were unable to
agree on the presence of a single aggravator. But this was almost certainly not the basis of
the Court’s decision. The Court does not require juror unanimity on alternative elements,
see Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), and although that rule has been criticized, see
Jessica A. Roth, Alternative Elements, 59 UCLA L. REV. 170, 190 n.67 (2011) (collecting
sources), there is no reason to think that the Court would have overruled its previous case
on point without mentioning the issue at all.
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The Supreme Court’s reference to harmless error provides further proof
that the case expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. The Hurst
Court noted that it did not reach the state’s argument that any error was
harmless because the Court “normally leaves it to state courts to consider
whether an error is harmless.”82 But a finding of harmless error would not be
the same as saying that the jury’s finding in Timothy Hurst’s case satisfied the
Sixth Amendment. A harmless error finding is a determination that, even
though the state violated the defendant’s rights, the result would have been the
same had no violation occurred.83 In other words, in leaving the harmless error
question for the Florida courts, the Hurst Court explicitly acknowledged that
Florida violated Timothy Hurst’s Sixth Amendment rights even though he had
a jury finding in his case.84
In short, it is not possible to read Hurst as a mere application of the rule
articulated in Ring to Florida’s capital sentencing system. Such a reading is
incompatible with the underlying facts of the case and the reasoning of the
decision. The next Part advances what we believe to be the best reading of
Hurst, and it explains what that reading means for the future application of the
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.
II.

HURST AND AN EXPANDED SIXTH AMENDMENT
SENTENCING DOCTRINE

The Court’s holding in Hurst expands the scope of the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine, rather than simply applying the rule articulated in Ring.
The best understanding of Hurst’s holding is that a jury must make all factual
findings required, beyond a reasonable doubt, to increase an available sentence.
Put differently, if a statute or sentencing scheme constrains the judge’s
discretion to increase a particular sentence, then a jury—and not a judge—must
make the factual finding necessary to lift that constraint. This reading of Hurst
changes the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine because it eliminates any
constitutional distinction between findings that “authorize” a sentence and
findings that are required to impose a sentence.
As this Part explains, such a reading of Hurst not only better explains the
Court’s decision in light of the facts and reasoning of the case, but it also creates
a clear, administrable standard that harmonizes the Court’s formalistic Sixth

82.
83.
84.

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
See generally 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 855
(4th ed. 2018) (discussing the harmless error standard).
See Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 623–24.
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Amendment sentencing cases with the values that underlie the jury right.
Tying the jury right at sentencing to constraints on judicial sentencing
authority limits legislatures’ ability to draft around the Sixth Amendment, and
it allows courts to avoid ephemeral distinctions between factual questions, legal
questions, and mixed questions of law and fact. This reading of Hurst also
preserves the ability of judges to engage in factfinding incidental to exercises of
sentencing discretion—a practice that has a long history in this country—
without eroding the Sixth Amendment right of defendants to have a jury make
those findings that increase their sentencing exposure.
In addition to rejecting a distinction between factual findings that
“authorize” a sentence and other required factual findings, Hurst may also have
expanded the Sixth Amendment doctrine in one additional regard: the right
not only to findings of historical fact, but also to findings that require
qualitative determinations.
A.

The Central Meaning of Hurst

Because Hurst did more than simply apply Ring, we must determine how,
precisely, Hurst modified the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. The
short answer is that Hurst appears to shift the Sixth Amendment inquiry from
whether there are factual findings required to “authorize” an increased
sentence to whether there are any factual findings that must be made before a
judge can impose a higher sentence. This shift from the factual findings for
“authorization” to any required factual findings would explain the Court’s
decision that Florida violated Hurst’s Sixth Amendment rights even though he
had a jury finding. It would also explain the Court’s acknowledgement of the
possibility of harmless error. In short, this reading would ensure that the
holding of Hurst matches both its facts and reasoning.
This reading of Hurst prohibits assigning to judges any factual findings
required for the imposition of an increased sentence. This would do more than
restrict advisory jury recommendations. It would also prohibit statutes that
require both the judge and the jury to make factual findings in order to increase
a sentence.85 Such a statute would violate the Sixth Amendment because it
would still make a judge’s finding of fact necessary to increase the sentence
from one category of punishment to another.
Hurst also suggests that the findings necessary for the imposition of a
higher sentence appear to include more than simply questions of historical fact.

85.

See infra Subpart III.A (discussing such statutes).
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In holding the Florida death penalty scheme unconstitutional, the Hurst Court
mentioned that the judge not only had to engage in factfinding, but also had to
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors: “The trial court alone must find ‘the
facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.’”86 Statutes routinely require judges to weigh sentencing factors
and make other qualitative judgments before increasing sentences, such as
requiring judges to find that a particular aggravating factor is “extraordinary.”87
All of these statutes impose requirements beyond a jury’s factfinding before a
judge can increase a defendant’s sentence. Thus, Hurst may also extend the
Sixth Amendment beyond questions of historical fact to qualitative
determinations at sentencing.
Our reading of Hurst applies not only to sentencing findings that statutes
require, but also to those that the Constitution requires. For example, the
Eighth Amendment does not permit the automatic imposition of capital
punishment. Instead, states must narrow the category of offenders who are
subject to the death penalty by making individualized sentencing
determinations, usually by identifying aggravating factors and by requiring the
consideration of mitigating factors that might outweigh those aggravating
factors.88 Thus, under our reading, the Sixth Amendment applies both to
statutorily and constitutionally required facts.
The Supreme Court has also read the Eighth Amendment to place
limitations on the ability of states to impose life without parole (LWOP)
sentences on juveniles.89 States that continue to impose LWOP sentences on
juveniles must ensure that no juveniles receive LWOP except “the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption”90—an admonition that
some states have interpreted as requiring a finding of “irreparable corruption”
before imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile.91 The Eighth Amendment
requires such findings in order to ensure proportionality in punishment; Hurst
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.
91.

Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2015)).
See infra Subpart IV.A.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s capital statute
in part because it narrowed the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty); see also
William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67 (2015)
(exploring possible consequences of this doctrine).
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80).
See, e.g., Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla. 2016); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 412
(Ga. 2016); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016); People v. Padilla, 209
Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (2016).
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explains that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, rather than a judge,
make those findings. In other words, a jury must make factual findings
required by the Eighth Amendment, not just those required by statute.
Reading Hurst to expand the Sixth Amendment to all findings that are
necessary to increase a sentence does more than simply explain how the Court
disposed of Timothy Hurst’s sentence. It also makes the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine more sensible. For one thing, it ensures that the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine is more than simply a drafting rule. In
particular, it prevents legislatures from drafting statutes that claim to
“authorize” higher sentences based on one or more jury findings, but then
require further factfinding by judges before permitting the imposition of a
higher sentence. At present, many sentencing systems distinguish between
factual findings that make a defendant eligible for an increased sentence and
other factual findings that a judge must make before imposing such a
sentence.92 But that distinction does not survive Hurst. Rather than treat
Hurst’s jury finding as sufficient because it “authorized” the capital sentence,
the Court instead insisted that a jury make all factual findings that are required
for the imposition of the death sentence.93
While the Hurst Court obviously rejected the difference between facts that
“authorize” a sentence and other facts that are required to impose a sentence, it
is less clear whether the Court meant to eliminate the distinction between
findings of historical fact and other findings. If it did, then Hurst would avoid
the difficulty of distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law.
Prior to Hurst, courts limited the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine to
factual questions; legal questions were exempt.94 Determining whether a
finding involves a “question of fact” or a “question of law” can be a complicated
endeavor, and it has created confusion and conflict in both the criminal and
civil justice systems.95 The enduring disagreement and disorder has led some to

92.
93.

94.

95.

See infra Subpart III.A.
“[T]he Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for death until
‘findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death’. . . . The State cannot
now treat the advisory recommendation by the jury as the necessary factual finding that
Ring requires.” Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016) (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 775.082(1) (2015)).
See, e.g., Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 251 (Nev. 2011); State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913,
919 (Minn. 2009); Carlson v. State, 128 P.3d 197, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); see also Sam
Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital
Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 558–61 (2010) (collecting cases).
See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546–55 (1965) (noting
that “[t]he distinction between fact and law is vital to a correct appreciation of the
respective roles of the administrative and the judiciary” and discussing the difficulties in
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conclude that there is no sensible way to distinguish between questions of law
and questions of fact.96 Focusing on what findings the statute requires, rather
than whether a finding involves a question of fact, avoids this legal quagmire.
B.

Sixth Amendment Formalism and Sixth Amendment Values

The Supreme Court has, at times, based its Sixth Amendment doctrine
more on history and formalism than on the values underlying the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right. The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has
walked a fine—perhaps nearly undetectable—line between reserving formal,
structured sentencing decisions for the jury, while still preserving a role for
judicial discretion in the selection of the ultimate sentence. The result has been
a confused and confusing Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine.97 The doctrine
has shifted over time, and it has, in many instances, failed to ensure that the jury
serves as a meaningful check on the imposition of punishment.
Hurst restores balance to the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine; it
respects the historical origins of the doctrine without allowing the formalistic
tendencies of the doctrine to eclipse the very reasons for guaranteeing a jury right
to defendants. In particular, it respects the long history of allowing judges to
determine what ultimate sentence to impose, while at the same time ensuring that
a jury makes decisions “which the law makes essential to the punishment.”98 It
does so by making the presence or absence of judicial sentencing discretion the
central Sixth Amendment inquiry, rather than relying on distinctions between

96.

97.
98.

making such a distinction); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 229, 232 (1985) (noting that “the ‘vexing’ distinction between ‘questions of law’ and
‘questions of fact’ . . . has long caused perplexity in such diverse areas as contracts, torts,
and administrative law”); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1876 (1966) (arguing that “[c]larity of thought is not
advanced by debating whether law application is law-making or fact-finding, as
commentators have done”).
See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 55 (1927) (stating that questions of law and fact “are not two mutually exclusive
kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter” and that distinction between
the two is created only by the “knife of policy” which “effects an artificial cleavage at the
point where the court chooses to draw the line”); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270–71
(1930) (observing that the “two terms of legal science . . . ’law’ and ‘fact.’ . . . readily
accommodate themselves to any meaning we desire to give them”); Ronald J. Allen &
Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1771
(2003) (“The ubiquitous distinction [between law and fact], despite playing many key
doctrinal roles, is muddled to the point of being conceptually meaningless.”).
See Bowman, supra note 10 (criticizing the doctrine); McConnell, supra note 46 (same).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)).
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findings that only “authorize” sentences and findings required to select a
sentence. It also possibly precludes relying on distinctions between findings of
fact and findings of law.
When the Supreme Court first established the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine, it did so in part based on originalist arguments. The
Apprendi Court cited these originalist roots in holding that New Jersey’s
sentencing factor was unconstitutional. Particularly, the Court emphasized that
“[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a
‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by
jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our
Nation’s founding.”99
But while it is clear that defendants are entitled to a jury determination of
guilt, the precise role that the jury was meant to play in sentencing is relatively
uncertain. Structured sentencing—both as required by the Court’s Eighth
Amendment cases, as well as created by state and federal legislatures—is a
creature of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. But the idea that
sentencing ought to occur as a separate proceeding that included facts and
considerations other than the defendant’s crime of conviction existed for a long
time prior to that development.
Early in American history, many crimes were sanction-specific—that is to
say, a statute would set forth a fixed punishment for all defendants convicted of a
certain crime. In those cases, a judge’s sentencing role was essentially ministerial,
limited to imposing the punishment required by the offense of conviction, and it
did not include consideration of any of either aggravating or mitigating factors.100

99. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
100. See id. at 479 (noting that early American “substantive criminal law tended to be sanctionspecific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. . . . [and a] judge was meant
simply to impose that sentence”); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (2013)
(highlighting the “intimate connection between crime and punishment” in early American
laws and practices).
This may explain why the U.S. Constitution frequently mentions trials and expressly
regulates criminal trial procedures but does not mention sentencing procedures or
practices. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing that an impeached official may still be
subject to a traditional criminal trial); id. at art. III, § 2 (setting forth procedures for
criminal trials in all cases but impeachment); id. at amend. VI (providing for accused
defendants to have various trial rights).
It is difficult to locate reliable historical sources that describe how a sentence from
within those ranges was selected. There is a surprising amount of disagreement over the
sentencing process at the founding. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal
Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 131 n.183 (2006) (noting that the “early history of
discretionary sentencing—especially the date of its adoption in the United States—is a
matter of some dispute” and collecting sources). But it is clear that most states did not
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But even some early criminal statutes specified a range of potential
punishments.101
Whatever the original understanding of the jury’s role at sentencing, it
was widely accepted by 1900 that judges should possess wide sentencing
discretion.102 But in the second half of the twentieth century, the wide discretion
enjoyed by trial judges became controversial.103 Highly discretionary sentencing
practices were perceived as creating unacceptable disparity in sentencing, and
many began to advocate for reforms to bring greater consistency and certainty
to the sentencing enterprise.104
A number of jurisdictions responded by adopting structured sentencing
systems. These systems curtailed judges’ discretion by identifying aggravating
and mitigating factors that judges were required to investigate. If such factors
were present, the schemes required judges to modify defendants’ sentences.105
Some of these factors were questions of historical fact, such as whether the
defendant killed multiple victims or killed during the commission of a crime;
others were quantifiable considerations, such as the amount of loss a defendant
caused or the number of prior criminal convictions.106
Some jurisdictions used sentencing reform as an alternative to criminal
code reform. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, passed as part of the Sentencing

101.
102.
103.

104.

105.
106.

employ sentencing juries at the time. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic
Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 316–19 (2003).
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158 (noting that “some early American statutes provided ranges of
permissible sentences”).
See Hessick, supra note 100, at 131 (“Discretionary sentencing became the American norm
no later than the nineteenth century.”).
See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) (arguing that
judicial sentencing discretion had led to wide disparities in sentencing outcomes); ERNEST
VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION
3–72 (1975) (arguing for a move toward “swift and certain” punishments in response to
the increases in crime rate); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS 3–34, 59–123 (1976) (calling for greater determinacy in sentencing); JAMES
Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 162–82 (1975) (arguing that rewards and penalties
shape criminal behavior).
For examples of such proposed reforms, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING (1976); PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN, AND DENNIS E. CURTIS,
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
(1977); and VON HIRSCH, supra note 103. See also NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 28–57 (1974) (stressing the need to reform sentencing practices as a
prerequisite to making imprisonment a rational and humane means of punishment).
See Frase, supra note 28; Reitz, supra note 28.
See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 68–70 (1998) (describing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ excessive
reliance on quantification).
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Reform Act of 1987, provide the most obvious example of this approach.107
Even those jurisdictions that adopted less elaborate sentencing structures
appear to have done so in part to effectuate changes ordinarily reserved for
substantive offenses. For example, states that adopted presumptive sentencing
regimes imposed aggravated sentences based on the kinds of facts previously
used to identify different crimes, such as whether the defendant caused any
physical harm to the victim.108
The more structured sentencing began to resemble new criminal codes,
the more it appeared to be an end-run around the jury determinations for
aggravated offenses. The Supreme Court made clear that it shared these
concerns when it announced the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine in
Apprendi and subsequent cases.109 But even as the Court expanded Sixth
Amendment protections to capital defendants in Ring and to noncapital
sentencing guidelines in Blakely, it was careful to affirm the constitutionality of
judges making factual findings to aid their broad discretion to select a sentence
within a statutory punishment range.110 Indeed, had the Court not reaffirmed
this ability, it likely would have undermined the historically-based reasoning of
its cases. After all, the country has a long history of judges deciding criminal
sentences.111
The Court dealt with this historical issue by resorting to formalism. The
Court explained that structured sentencing could not reallocate the jury’s
determination of elements at trial to the judge during sentencing. By
concluding that structured sentencing factors were the “functional equivalent”
of elements, the Court was able to extend the jury trial right to sentencing
determinations without questioning the historical power of judges to make

107. See id. at 39 (stating that the “legislative origins” of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “may
be found in the failed efforts of the 1970s to achieve a recodification of the federal criminal
law”).
108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D) (1); D.C.
CODE § 24-403.01(b-2)(2)(H) (Lexis 2001); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5–5-3.2(a)(1) (2012);
IND. CODE § 35-38-1-7.1(1) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d) (8).
109. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492–93 (2000) (striking down a sentencing
statute increased punishment based on the defendant’s mens rea, which “is perhaps as
close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense ‘element’”).
110. See infra note 234 (collecting cases).
111. See Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 403 (1876) (“According to the old law, all the jury had to do
was to determine the question of guilt or innocence. It was the duty of the court, after a
verdict of guilty, to declare the punishment which the law imposed. If any discretion was
permitted as to the punishment, that discretion was exercised by the court alone.”);
Iontcheva, supra note 100, at 316–18 (documenting that jury sentencing was adopted by
only eleven states before the beginning of the twentieth century). See also supra notes 100–
103 and accompanying text.
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most sentencing decisions. In other words, by equating structured sentencing
enhancements with elements of new, aggravated crimes, the Court constructed
a doctrine that vindicated the values underlying the jury trial right. Because
structured sentencing looked different than judges making factual findings
when exercising broad sentencing discretion, the Court did not have to
repudiate the historical sentencing authority of judges.
But the fine line between structured sentencing and judicial sentencing
discretion that the Court had attempted to walk largely disappeared in
United States v. Booker.112 Following Blakely, it was clear that the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine had called into question the constitutionality
of structured sentencing, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.113
Because the Guidelines required judges to find facts in order to determine the
applicable guideline range, the federal system clearly violated the rule
articulated in Ring and Blakely—that a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt facts that increase a defendant’s sentencing exposure.114
But in striking down the Guidelines under the Sixth Amendment, the
Booker Court adopted a remedy that not only watered down the doctrine’s rule,
but also appeared to unmoor the doctrine from the values underlying the Sixth
Amendment. The Court held that the Guidelines were constitutional so long as
they were advisory, not mandatory.115 Judges still had to make factual findings
required by the Guidelines: A judge had to consider the Guideline range in
selecting a sentence, and reversal on appeal was more likely if she sentenced
outside of the Guideline advisory range.116 The idea behind the remedy was
that the judicial factfinding in this context did not violate the Sixth Amendment
because judges now had at least some discretion to deviate from the Guidelines.
And because judges had regained some discretion, the Guideline advisory
range did not define the maximum punishment—the statute did.117
112. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
113. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines Are Dead! Long Live Sentencing
Guidelines!, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 25, 2004), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
law_and_policy/2004/06/sentencing_guid.html [https://perma.cc/3XX2-BWF5] (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely seems to mean that the standard operating
procedures for most sentencing guideline systems—including those of the federal
sentencing guidelines—are no longer constitutionally sound.”).
114. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
115. Id.
116. These requirements were made clear in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48, 350–51 (2007).
117. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (“[T]he federal sentencing statute, as amended, makes the
Guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as
well.” (internal citations omitted)).
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After Booker, judges were still finding facts, and those facts were still
driving sentences. Because a judge was no longer always required to follow the
Guidelines’ recommendation and could, in theory, impose any sentence within
the statutory range, this approach arguably satisfied the formal rule developed
in Apprendi and Ring. But it did not vindicate Sixth Amendment jury trial
values.
The Booker Court did not attempt to explain how its remedy vindicated
Sixth Amendment values. Nor is it clear that it could have done so. The Sixth
Amendment jury right functions as a structural limitation on government
officials, and it also confers an individual right onto defendants.118 The
Supreme Court has often highlighted the jury right as a structural limitation in
its Sixth Amendment sentencing cases. As the Court in Blakely stated, the jury
right is “a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.
Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the
judiciary.”119 Put differently, the jury right ensures that the people can check
decisions by government officials in particular cases; if the jury does not agree
with the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges in a particular case, they can
refuse to convict. As Blakely explained, structured sentencing undermines the
jury’s structural role as a check on government officials. Indeed, “[t]he jury
could not function as circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice if it were
relegated to making a determination that the defendant at some point did
something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of
the crime the State actually seeks to punish.”120
On some level, the formalistic rule endorsed in Booker continues to rely
on democratic involvement as a structural limitation, but it is a check on the
legislative branch, rather than a check on the judiciary.121 The people, through
their elected legislators, determine what punishment range ought to
correspond to a particular crime. Because the voting public knows that a judge
is empowered to impose the maximum sentence upon a finding of guilty, then
legislatures will only enact statutes with maximum authorized punishment that
is appropriate upon a bare finding of guilt rather than based upon additional
aggravating factors.

118. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 681–
86 (1996).
119. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
120. Id. at 306–07.
121. See King & Klein, supra note 10, at 1487 (describing this structural limitation in the context
of the Apprendi rule).

474

66 UCLA L. R EV. 448 (2019)

Even so, this structural limitation is weak. Imagine, for example, a state
that punishes burglary by up to ten years’ imprisonment. This state also advises
judges that they should only impose a five-year sentence unless the defendant
possessed a gun during the burglary, and it makes reversal on appeal far more
likely if the judge does not find that the defendant possessed a gun. The voting
public knows that judges have the authority to impose ten years in prison based
only on a defendant’s commission of a burglary. But it also knows that judges
are probably only going to impose a ten-year sentence on a burglar if he also
possessed a gun. So, the voting public will likely approve of such legislation if it
thinks that burglars should receive five-year sentences and that armed burglars
should receive ten-year sentences. Nonetheless, some unarmed burglars may
receive ten-year sentences based on judges’ discretion. This “advisory”
sentencing system has effectively recategorized an element of a crime—possession
of a gun—that ought to be found by a jury to a sentencing factor that will be
found by a judge.
One might argue that a defendant in this hypothetical advisory system is
no worse off than a defendant in a system of broad judicial sentencing
discretion; in the latter system a judge is unlikely to impose the maximum
sentence on defendants unless there are some aggravating facts present. The
advisory system might even be preferable, one might argue, because it identifies
ex ante the facts that defendants ought to dispute at sentencing, and it better
ensures that defendants are treated similarly to one another. But those
arguments do not explain why judges ought to be finding those sentencing
facts, rather than juries. Nor do those arguments address the fundamental
Sixth Amendment objection—that advisory sentencing systems are designed
precisely to avoid having juries decide those facts that the legislature has
identified as deserving of additional punishment. Further, it does not account
for the lowering of the required standard of proof from beyond a reasonable
doubt to a preponderance of the evidence.
Nor is it persuasive to say that in the past judges have enjoyed the ability to
make factual findings in aid of their sentencing decisions as a basis for
reallocating elements of a crime to sentencing. Judges enjoyed that discretion—
at least in part, if not entirely—because people believed that it was impossible to
identify ex ante those facts that ought to increase or decrease sentences.122

122. See, e.g., Debate, Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable Weapon in the
War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1284–85
(1999) (debate between Rep. Asa Hutchinson and U.S. District Court Judge Stanley
Sporkin); Peter A. Mancuso, Resentencing After the “Fall” of Rockefeller: The Failure of the
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Sentencing was thought to be a complex, circumstance-driven, and defendantspecific endeavor. Judges could consider any evidence about the defendant and
her crime, and appellate courts would not disturb those decisions.123
But once jurisdictions reduce sentencing determinations to a clear list of
relevant considerations, then there is no need to give judges broad, unfettered
sentencing discretion. Perhaps most importantly, there is no excuse to deprive
a defendant of a jury to make those findings that define the crime itself. It is, of
course, true that having a jury find those facts will be more time consuming and
expensive. But time and expense are a natural consequence of all criminal
process rights. And if the state were able to dispense with individual rights
simply based on the time and money necessary to ensure them, then the
Constitution is all but worthless.
Hurst pushes back on the encroachment of Sixth Amendment sentencing
rights that has occurred in recent years. It restores a balance between the
historical origins of the Sixth Amendment doctrine and the reasons underlying
the jury right, and it does so in formalistic terms that are sensible and easily
administrable. It categorizes any finding that must be made in order for a judge
to increase a sentence as a jury question. If a judge cannot exercise her
sentencing discretion without first making a finding, then that finding triggers
the Sixth Amendment. This reading stays true to the origins of the Sixth
Amendment doctrine. It both ensures that the jury finding is not a “mere
preliminary to a judicial inquisition” and retains the ability of judges to make
findings in aid of their sentencing discretion. But it does so without allowing
the doctrine to turn into little more than a drafting rule.
The next two Parts explain, in detail, how Hurst changes the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine. Part III focuses on Hurst’s rejection of any
constitutional distinction between factual findings that “authorize” a sentence
and other factual findings that are required to impose a sentence. Part IV
addresses the possibility that Hurst expanded the jury right beyond mere
findings of historical fact to any findings, including qualitative determinations,
that are required to impose an increased sentence.

Drug Law Reform Acts of 2004 and 2005 to Remedy the Injustices of New York’s Rockefeller
Drug Laws and the Compromise of 2009, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1535, 1541 (2010).
123. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–52 (1949).
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III.

THE MYTH OF “AUTHORIZING” SENTENCES

The first consequence of Hurst is that it eliminates the distinction between
factual findings that “authorize” an increased sentence and other factual
findings required to impose an increased sentence. But there are several
sentencing systems that have relied on that distinction in order to continue
requiring judges to make factual findings in the wake of Ring and Blakely.
These systems claim to comply with the Sixth Amendment because they
“authorize” a judge’s higher sentence upon a jury finding of a single aggravating
fact, and they require judges to engage in further factfinding only to determine
what particular sentence to impose. Such systems arguably comply with Ring
and Blakely, but they run afoul of Hurst. As this Part explains, the idea that only
certain facts authorize the higher sentence, even though the statutory scheme
requires other factual findings in order for the sentence to be imposed, rests on
a mistaken understanding of the Sixth Amendment’s role in the selection of a
defendant’s ultimate sentence. Although defendants do not have a Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury select the ultimate sentence that will be
imposed on them, they do have a right to have a jury decide all of the facts not
incidental to a judge’s exercise of unfettered sentencing discretion.
This Part identifies those systems that purport to reserve factual findings
that “authorize” a higher sentence for juries, but also require judges to engage in
further factfinding to determine what particular sentence to impose. This Part
then explains why there is no principled way to distinguish between findings
that authorize a sentence and findings required to impose a sentence, especially
in the wake of Hurst.
A.

Cataloguing Sentencing Systems That Require Judicial Factfinding

1.

Florida

The Supreme Court invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing system in
January 2016 when it decided Hurst. In March 2017, the Florida legislature
amended its death penalty statute. It now requires that juries find aggravating
circumstances, state which specific aggravating factors exist, and weigh any
mitigating factors against the aggravating factors before making a death
sentence recommendation to a judge.124 These jury decisions must be
unanimous.125 If a jury makes a recommendation of life in prison, then the
124. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2017).
125. See id.
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judge must impose a sentence of life.126 If a jury makes a recommendation of
death, then the judge can impose either a sentence of death or a sentence of
life.127 But the judge must make her own determination of the appropriate
sentence: She must make her own findings about the existence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, she must make her own finding of “whether
there are sufficient aggravating factors to warrant the death penalty,” and she
must weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors.128 In other
words, Florida changed its capital sentencing system so that the sentencing
judge cannot disregard a jury recommendation of life; but the judge must still
engage in independent factfinding and weighing before imposing the death
penalty. The Florida Supreme Court has decided that so long as the jury’s
findings and recommendations are unanimous, these changes satisfy the ruling
in Hurst.129 But, by continuing to require the judge to engage in independent
factfinding and weighing, Florida has not cured the defect identified in Hurst.
2.

Montana

Montana employs a capital sentencing scheme that involves both judge
and jury, but it leaves the ultimate sentencing decision in capital cases up to
judges.130 After a guilty verdict or plea, the judge conducts a separate
sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant should receive the
death penalty.131 As with Florida, there must be a jury finding that the
“enhancing act, omission, or fact occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.”132 But
this finding is not enough to impose a death sentence. The judge must make a

126. See Id. § 921.141(3)(a)(1).
127. See id.
128. Id. § 921.141(4) (“In each case in which the court imposes a sentence of death, the court
shall, considering the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings, enter a written
order addressing the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (6) found to exist, the
mitigating circumstances in subsection (7) reasonably established by the evidence, whether
there are sufficient aggravating factors to warrant the death penalty, and whether the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances reasonably established by the
evidence.”).
129. See Perry v. State, 201 So.3d 630 (Fla. 2016).
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (2017). Interestingly, Montana did not repeal its pre–Ring
statute that requires judges to find aggravating facts, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301
(2017), but the new statute, § 46-1-401, clearly contemplates that the jury find aggravating
facts in death cases. To date, Montana has not had any case that has established how these
provisions should be applied, although one capital case is currently pending. See
Withdrawal of Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty, Montana v. Barrus, No. CDC-201715 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. July 19, 2018).
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2017).
132. Id. § 46-1-401.
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separate finding that an aggravating fact is present and that the aggravating
fact(s) outweigh mitigating evidence.133
A straightforward application of Hurst shows that the Montana statute
violates the Sixth Amendment.134 By requiring the judge to find the presence of
the aggravating fact, Montana violates the Sixth Amendment in the same way
that Florida did in Hurst. Because Montana has not sentenced an offender to
death since 1996, its courts have not to date addressed the potential impact of
Ring or Hurst on its death-sentencing scheme.135
3.

Alabama

In April 2017, the Alabama legislature changed its capital sentencing
scheme.136 Under the new statute, the jury is responsible for sentencing in
capital cases.137 The jury makes all findings with respect to aggravating and
mitigating sentencing factors, and it makes the final decision with respect to
whether the defendant receives a LWOP sentence or a death sentence.138 The
new statute applies to all capital cases sentenced on or after April 11, 2017.139
But prior to April 11, 2017, Alabama’s capital sentencing scheme was, in
many ways, like Florida’s pre-Hurst scheme. The Alabama scheme required
juries to make a recommendation as to the sentence.140 After the jury’s

133. Id. § 46-18-301.
134. It is likely that the capital scheme violates the Montana Constitution as well. See MONT.
CONST. art. II, §§ 24, 26 (articulating the state constitutional right to trial by jury); State v.
Dawson, 761 P.2d 352, 360 (Mont. 1988) (applying pre–Ring Sixth Amendment doctrine
to Montana Capital cases); State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087, 1105–06 (Mont. 1985).
135. See State v. Johnson, 969 P.2d 925 (Mont. 1998) (sentence imposed in September 1996). A
recent death penalty case has raised Hurst issues. See Withdrawal of Notice of Intent to
Seek Death Penalty, supra note 130, at 1; see also Montana, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/montana-1#sent [https://perma.cc/9Y4L-YF9D]. In recent
years, the Montana legislature has considered passing a statute to abolish the death penalty
completely, which partially explains its failure to update its statute after Ring and Hurst.
Montana has executed three people since 1976, and currently has only two individuals
sentenced to death in its prisons. Id. The closest the state came to abolition was in 2015,
when the bill died on a 50–50 house vote. Montana Examines Death Penalty After Judge
Blocks Executions, FLATHEAD BEACON (Feb. 6, 2017), http://flatheadbeacon.com/2017/02/06/
montana-examines-death-penalty-judge-blocks-executions [https://perma.cc/FQR4-KZ6H].
136. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (West 2017); see Kent Faulk, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey Signs Bill:
Judges Can No Longer Override Juries in Death Penalty Cases, AL.COM (Apr. 11, 2017),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/04/post_317.html [https://perma.cc/
U8WD-FVND].
137. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (West 2017).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 13A-5-45.
140. Id. § 13A-5-47.
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recommendation, the judge made an independent determination about the
existence of aggravating factors and the appropriateness of the death penalty.141
The judge had the power to increase a life sentence to a death sentence, or
alternatively, decrease a death sentence to a life sentence.142
In the aftermath of Hurst, Alabama inmates that received the death
penalty under Alabama’s previous capital sentencing scheme filed petitions for
certiorari with the Supreme Court for review of their cases. The Court initially
denied certiorari in one of these cases, Johnson v. Alabama, on the day before
it decided Hurst.143 After the Court decided Hurst, it granted a motion for
rehearing in Johnson, vacated the lower court’s judgment, and instructed the
Alabama courts to revisit the case in light of the holding in Hurst.144 In the
months after the Hurst decision, the Court reversed three other Alabama cases
pending direct review, vacated the sentences, and remanded them back to the
Alabama state courts.145
Despite the Supreme Court’s reversals, the Alabama courts continue to
uphold their capital sentences in the wake of Hurst. One Alabama appellate
court, three months after the Court decided Hurst, affirmed a remanded death
sentence without considering the impact of Hurst.146
In Ex Parte Bohannon, the Alabama Supreme Court did consider the
effect of Hurst on Alabama’s capital sentencing scheme.147 Surprisingly, the
Bohannon Court decided that Alabama’s pre–April 2017 system—which was
largely indistinguishable from the Florida system that was invalidated in
Hurst148—did not violate the Sixth Amendment. The Bohannon Court reasoned
that a jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance “makes a defendant
eligible for the death penalty.”149 The Alabama Supreme Court explained:
Ring and Hurst require only that the jury find the existence of the
aggravating factor that makes a defendant eligible for the death

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.

Id.
Id.
136 S. Ct. 857 (2016) (mem.).
136 S. Ct. 1837 (2016) (mem.).
See Wimbley v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) (mem.); Kirksey v. Alabama. 136 S. Ct.
2409 (2016) (mem.); Russell v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 158 (2016) (mem.).
See Lane v. Alabama, No. CR-10-1343, 2016 WL 1728753 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2016).
Two dissents raised the Hurst issue, but the majority opinion failed to address it.
222 So. 3d 525 (Ala. 2016).
The only differences appear to be that Alabama required jury unanimity for the
aggravating factor, and that the jury could only recommend a sentence of death if at least
ten of twelve jurors agreed. ALA. CODE § 13A-5–47 (2015). But as discussed above, those
features did not drive the Hurst decision. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
Bohannon, 222 So. 3d at 532.

480

66 UCLA L. R EV. 448 (2019)

penalty—the plain language in those cases requires nothing more
and nothing less. Accordingly, because in Alabama a jury, not the
judge, determines by a unanimous verdict the critical finding that
an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt to
make a defendant death-eligible, Alabama’s capital-sentencing
scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment.150

The Alabama court did not grapple with the fact that Timothy Hurst also
had such a jury finding, but instead characterized Hurst as simply applying the
rule from Ring.151 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bohannon.152
4.

Missouri and Indiana

In Missouri and Indiana, the jury makes the capital sentencing
determination in every case unless there is a hung jury.153 If the jury cannot
reach a sentencing decision, the judge then determines whether to sentence the
offender to death.154 As a result, the capital statute in both states authorizes the
judge to make the capital sentencing determination in the case of a hung
sentencing jury, meaning that the state can impose the statutory maximum of
death without the required jury determination of the presence of aggravating
factors and the determination that such factor(s) outweigh the mitigating
evidence offered at sentencing.155 Thus, both provisions violate the rules from
Ring and Hurst.156
5.

Alaska and Arizona

Alaska and Arizona both have presumptive sentencing systems.157 They
require judges to impose presumptive sentences (or sentences within a
presumptive range), unless aggravating or mitigating factors are present.
Judges can only sentence above the presumptive sentence if at least one
150. Id.
151. “Hurst applies Ring and reiterates that a jury, not a judge, must find the existence of an
aggravating factor to make a defendant death-eligible.” Id.
152. Bohannon v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017).
153. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2017); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f) (2017).
154. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030; IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f).
155. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030; IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f).
156. Interestingly, the Missouri Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on two capital
cases challenging death sentences imposed by a judge after a hung jury at sentencing. See
Joseph Welling, Missouri’s Death Penalty Jury Deadlock Provision Is Unconstitutional, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 2019. Indiana has never had a judge sentence a capital
defendant with a hung jury at sentencing. Id.
157. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C) (2017).
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aggravating sentencing factor is either found by a jury or otherwise complies
with Blakely.158 But whether a single aggravating factor is present is not the only
statutory requirement for whether judges can increase a defendant’s sentence
above the presumptive sentence. Alaska and Arizona also require judges to
determine whether any other aggravating factors exist, and they require judges
to weigh all of the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether an
aggravated sentence is appropriate.159
For example, Alaska instructs judges not to increase a defendant’s
sentence above the presumptive range of sentences unless one of the statutory
aggravating factors is established.160 But it also instructs judges that any
sentence outside of the presumptive range “shall be based on the totality of the
aggravating and mitigating factors” set out in the statute.161
Similarly, Arizona law provides that aggravated sentences “may be
imposed only if one or more of the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation
of the crime are found to be true by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt
or are admitted by the defendant.”162 But it also instructs judges that, “[i]n
determining what sentence to impose, the court shall take into account the
amount of aggravating circumstances.”163
It is significant that Alaska and Arizona both require judges to impose
sentences based on a totality of aggravating factors, but both states only require
that a jury find a single factor beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise comply
with Blakely. This is because judges may find additional aggravating factors
without using the heightened reasonable doubt standard, and because they
must consider those judge-found aggravating factors when deciding which
158. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C). A factor complies
with Blakely if it is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or if the defendant admits to
it. A factor is exempt from Blakely if it rests on the Almanderez-Torres exception to the
Sixth Amendment. See infra text accompanying note 163.
159. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C).
160. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(h) (“If one of the aggravating factors in (c) of this section is
established as provided in (f) (1) and (2) of this section, the court may increase the term of
imprisonment up to the maximum term of imprisonment.”).
161. Id. § 12.55.155(b) (“Sentences under this section that are outside of the presumptive ranges
set out in AS 12.55.125 shall be based on the totality of the aggravating and mitigating
factors set out in (c) and (d) of this section.”).
162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C).
163. “If the trier of fact finds at least one aggravating circumstance, the trial court may find by a
preponderance of the evidence additional aggravating circumstances. In determining
what sentence to impose, the court shall take into account the amount of aggravating
circumstances and whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is sufficiently
substantial to justify the lesser term. If the trier of fact finds aggravating circumstances and
the court does not find any mitigating circumstances, the court shall impose an aggravated
sentence.” Id. § 13-701(F).
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sentence to impose. As a result, Alaska and Arizona make judge-found facts
necessary to increase some defendants’ sentences.164
This feature of the two systems can result in defendants receiving
aggravated sentences without any jury findings whatsoever, because both
systems identify a defendant’s prior conviction as an aggravating factor.165
Almendarez-Torres v. United States exempts prior convictions from the Sixth
Amendment jury requirement.166 As a consequence, courts can sentence
defendants with a prior conviction in the same way as they could before Blakely:
Those defendants do not have a right to a jury finding of any aggravating facts
that may ultimately result in the imposition of an aggravated sentence; the
judge finds all of those facts.
6.

New York’s Persistent Offender Statute

The Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions is similarly at the
heart of New York’s persistent felony offender law. That statute allows for
third-time felons to be sentenced as if they had committed a class A-I felony.167
But the statute does not apply automatically to all third-time felons. Judges not
only must determine whether a defendant has two prior felony convictions, but
also must determine whether “the history and character of the defendant and
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended
incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest.”168
Only if the court is “of the opinion” that such a lengthy sentence is appropriate
will it impose the aggravated sentence, and “the reasons for the court’s opinion
shall be set forth in the record.”169
To be clear, like Alaska and Arizona, New York appears to allow a
sentencing increase even if the sentencing court does not find additional facts
that support a lengthy sentence.170 But appellate courts have often reversed

164. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
165. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (7), (8), (12), (15), (18) (B), (19), (20), (21), (31); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D) (11).
166. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
167. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10(2) (McKinney 2017). This means that the prior convictions make
the current conviction count, for sentencing purposes, as if it were a much more serious
offense.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. At the very least, the New York courts have interpreted the statute to permit a sentencing
increase under those circumstances. See People v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 194, 197 (N.Y. 2005).
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sentences where the trial judge has failed to make additional factual findings.171
Thus, it appears that additional factfinding is, as a practical matter, a
requirement, even though as a formal matter, judges technically have the
discretion to impose the higher sentence even when no other aggravating facts
are present.172
7.

Federal Sentencing

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines assign narrow sentencing ranges
within the broader statutory sentencing limits based on a defendant’s “real
offense conduct”—for example, the manner in which different defendants
commit the same offense in different ways. The Guidelines Manual provides
detailed rules indicating how various factual findings adjust the Guideline
sentencing range.173 Beginning in 1987, federal law required judges to make
factual findings specified in the Guidelines Manual, and it required them to
sentence within the narrow range that the adjustments prescribed.174
The Supreme Court found this system unconstitutional in United States v.
Booker.175 But rather than requiring a jury to make the factual findings required
by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court made those Guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory.176 Still, after Booker, trial judges are not free to

171. See Portalatin v. Graham, 624 F.3d 69, 101 n.18 (2d Cir. 2010) (Winter, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases).
172. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (“If the trier of fact finds at least one aggravating
circumstance, the trial court may find by a preponderance of the evidence additional
aggravating circumstances. In determining what sentence to impose, the court shall take
into account the amount of aggravating circumstances and whether the amount of
mitigating circumstances is sufficiently substantial to justify the lesser term. If the trier of
fact finds aggravating circumstances and the court does not find any mitigating
circumstances, the court shall impose an aggravated sentence.”).
173. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/GLMFull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/56ZH-LRPL].
174. Judges were permitted to depart from the Guidelines (for example, sentence outside the
Guideline range) only in situations expressly identified by the Guidelines, see id. at 457–74
(identifying appropriate and inappropriate grounds for departure), or where the
sentencing judge found that “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2018); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 106, at
101–03 (noting that this provision severely hampered district court ability to depart
downward from the Guidelines even after Koon articulated the abuse of discretion
standard).
175. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
176. Id. at 245.
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ignore the Guidelines altogether. Sentencing judges must begin each
sentencing by calculating the correct Guideline range, and they must consider
that range along with various other factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
when imposing a sentence.177 Those factors include not only the sentencing
range recommended by the Guidelines, but also the nature and circumstances
of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness
of the offense, and the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant.178
In addition to requiring trial judges to calculate the Guideline range and
consider it in imposing sentences, the Booker Court also ensured a continuing
role for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines through appellate review of sentencing
decisions.179 The Court instructed appellate courts to review sentences to
determine whether they are reasonable with respect to § 3553(a)—that is, the
list of factors (including the Guideline range) that district courts must consider
in imposing a sentence.
Making the Guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory, arguably avoids
the constitutional problem identified in Apprendi and Blakely. In an advisory
guideline system, a factual finding is no longer required to sentence above the
Guideline range.180 A sentencing judge can, at least in theory, sentence
177. Id. at 259–60.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides, in relevant part:
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The
court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . .
(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . .
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

179. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
180. Id. at 259–60.
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anywhere within the sentencing range without making any additional factual
findings. But, in practice, judges continue to sentence most defendants in
accordance with the Guidelines, and appellate courts routinely reverse judges
who stray too far from the narrow Guideline ranges.181 Indeed, the Supreme
Court appears to have endorsed those appellate practices, at least in dicta.182
Because federal judges must find facts in order to make Guideline
adjustments, and because judges who stray too far from the Guidelines’
advisory range will be reversed on appeal, it is clear that judges are required to
make factual findings before they may impose an increased sentence.
B.

Authorization, Selection, and Discretion

When the systems described in this Part have been challenged on Sixth
Amendment grounds, courts have drawn a distinction between those factual
findings that “authorize” a higher sentence and factual findings that merely aid
the judge in selecting a sentence from the available range. Once a defendant is
eligible for a higher sentence, these courts reason, a judge can make any
additional factual findings because defendants are not entitled to a jury
determination of the ultimate sentence. But the distinction between factual
findings that “authorize” the imposition of a higher sentence and other
required factual findings is more artificial than real. Nor is recognizing a jury
right to all required factual findings the equivalent of recognizing the right to a
jury determination of the ultimate sentence.
1.

The Elusive Distinction Between Findings That “Authorize”
and Findings That Are “Required”

The idea that only those factual findings that “authorize” a higher
sentence may trigger the Sixth Amendment jury right is consistent with
reasonable readings of Ring and Blakely. Blakely made clear that the jury trial
right arises when a judge sentences above “the maximum [sentence] he may
impose without any additional findings.”183 The Supreme Court appeared to
confirm that the Blakely question was one of legal authorization to impose a

181. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federalsentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2017_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ALY-4EXY].
182. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 46, at 34–36 (discussing dicta in Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38 (2007), and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)).
183. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
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sentence in United States v. Booker.184 Booker held that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines suffered from the same Sixth Amendment problem as the
Washington state sentencing guidelines at issue in Blakely.185 But the Booker
Court remedied the Sixth Amendment problem, not by requiring sentencing
juries, but rather by making the federal guidelines advisory.186
After Booker, federal judges must still make the factual findings specified
in the Guidelines, and they must “consider” those findings. But because the
guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory, judges may—at least in
theory—impose heightened guidelines sentences without factual findings. It
was this idea that judges had the authority to impose a sentence within the full
statutory range, even if they had to engage in factfinding before actually
selecting a sentence, that the remedial Booker majority said satisfied the Sixth
Amendment.187
But Hurst seriously undercuts that analysis. Hurst demonstrates that the
mere presence of a jury finding is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment;
the Sixth Amendment may also apply if a statute requires judges to make
additional factual findings and if it authorizes a higher sentence only after a
judge weighs aggravating factors against mitigating factors. When systems
such as Alaska, Arizona, and the federal system require judges to consider the
existence of other aggravating sentencing factors found by judges, not juries,188
it is difficult to argue that the jury has found all of the facts “which the law
makes essential to the punishment.”189
It is not enough that this additional factfinding and weighing occurs after
an initial jury finding of a single aggravated factor (or a judicial finding of a
prior conviction under Almendarez-Torres). If such a finding were sufficient,
then the jury’s recommendation of death in Hurst would have cured any
constitutional violation in that case.190 The Hurst jury could have made that
recommendation only because it found the presence of at least one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Hurst Court dismissed as irrelevant
Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 245.
Id.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (2017) (“In determining what sentence to
impose, the court shall take into account the amount of aggravating circumstances and
whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is sufficiently substantial to justify the
lesser term.” (emphasis added)).
189. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)).
190. See discussion supra Subpart I.B (explaining that the Court did not treat Hurst’s claim as a
facial challenge or an overbreadth claim).

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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the fact that the jury had made such a finding. The Florida scheme violated the
Sixth Amendment, according to the Court, because “[t]he trial court alone
must find ‘the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and
‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances.’”191
It is this feature of the Hurst decision that makes the Alabama Supreme
Court’s decision in Bohannon and the new Florida capital sentencing system
appear unconstitutional. Both require independent judicial factfinding before
the judge can impose a sentence of death, and so they appear to reintroduce the
very feature that rendered the sentence imposed in Hurst unconstitutional.
Although the sentencing judge in Hurst could have imposed a death sentence
on Timothy Hurst even if the jury had recommended a life sentence, that
decision sequence did not happen in the case. Hurst’s jury recommended the
death penalty, which means that the jury necessarily found at least one
aggravating factor. In other words, Timothy Hurst received the same
procedural protections afforded under the pre-2017 Alabama system and the
new Florida legislation,192 yet the Supreme Court held that those procedures
violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Although the Florida legislature has
changed the jury’s “advisory sentence” into a “recommended” sentence, the
judge continues to play a “central and singular role” under the revised law.193
Requiring a jury to make an eligibility finding and then requiring further
findings by the judge to impose the death penalty still requires the judge to
make factual findings before imposing a higher sentence. That is precisely what
Hurst forbids.
While the new Florida capital sentencing system and the pre–April 2017
Alabama systems repeat the central defect of the system struck down in Hurst,
one could attempt to distinguish the Alaska and Arizona sentencing systems.
As the Hurst Court noted, Florida defendants were not “eligible for death until
[there were] ‘findings by the court that such person shall be punished by

191. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016).
192. The new legislation did add two procedural protections that Timothy Hurst did not have:
The jury must find the existence of each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the jury’s decision must be unanimous. Compare FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2017)
(including these protections), with FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2015) (not mentioning these
protections). See also Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620 (“The jury recommended death by a vote of 7
to 5.”). But the Hurst Court did not mention the burden of proof or juror unanimity when
explaining why the Florida system violated the Sixth Amendment; it focused instead on the
allocation of authority between judge and jury.
193. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (“The State fails to appreciate the central and singular role the judge
plays under Florida law.”).
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death.’”194 The Alaska and Arizona sentencing statutes suggest that courts can
increase sentences based on the presence of a single aggravating factor.195 For
example, if there were only a single aggravating factor present in a particular
case, and if a jury found that factor, the judge could impose an aggravated
sentence in that case. As a result, state courts have insisted that any subsequent
judicial factfinding does not trigger the Sixth Amendment because it is not
necessary to authorize or to permit the imposition of an aggravated sentence.196
Instead, the factfinding is merely necessary for the judge to select a particular
sentence within the now-expanded statutory sentencing range.197
But it is not really clear what the courts mean by the words “authorize” or
“permit” if judges must determine the sentence itself through additional
factfinding and weighing. Both the Alaska and Arizona statutes use mandatory

194. Id.
195. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(h) (“If one of the aggravating factors in (c) of this section is
established as provided in (f) (1) and (2) of this section, the court may increase the term of
imprisonment up to the maximum term of imprisonment.” (emphasis added)). The
Arizona statute reads:
The minimum or maximum term imposed pursuant to § 13-702, 13-703, 13704, 13-705, 13-708, 13-710, 13-1406, 13-3212 or 13-3419 may be imposed only
if one or more of the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation of the crime
are found to be true by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt or are
admitted by the defendant, except that an alleged aggravating circumstance
under subsection D, paragraph 11 of this section shall be found to be true by
the court, or in mitigation of the crime are found to be true by the court, on
any evidence or information introduced or submitted to the court or the trier
of fact before sentencing or any evidence presented at trial, and factual
findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the record at
the time of sentencing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(C) (emphasis added).

196. See Cleveland v. State, 143 P.3d 977, 987 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); State v. Martinez, 115
P.3d 618, 623–24 (Ariz. 2005).
197. As the Arizona Supreme Court explained:
The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, or
a defendant admit, any fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to
establish the range within which a judge may sentence the defendant. If,
however, additional facts are relevant merely to the exercise of a judge’s
discretion in determining the specific sentence to impose on a defendant
within a given statutory sentencing range, the Sixth Amendment permits the
judge to find those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Under A.R.S.
§ 13-702, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a defendant to an
aggravated sentence. Therefore, once a jury finds or a defendant admits a
single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge
to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence
up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625. Washington courts have relied on this analysis. See Cleveland,
143 P.3d at 987–88 (citing and quoting Martinez).
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language in instructing judges how to sentence.198 Unless the state courts are
reading this mandatory language out of their statutes, it is difficult to
understand how they can interpret these statutes as giving judges discretion to
sentence anywhere within the aggravated range on the basis of a single Blakelycompliant or Blakely-exempt factor.199
Imagine, for example, a defendant who has a prior conviction, and who
may have other aggravating factors associated with his crime. A prosecutor
could insist that a judge conduct a hearing to learn about those other
aggravating factors. If the judge refused to conduct such a hearing and imposed
a presumptive or mitigated sentence on the defendant, then the state could
appeal. The appellate court would reverse because the trial judge failed to
follow the statutorily-imposed sentencing procedure; the statute tells the judge
that she must conduct the hearing, she must find all of the possible aggravating
factors, and then she must weigh those aggravating factors against mitigating
factors. In other words, the judge cannot enter a sentence unless she first makes
those additional findings and engages in the weighing process required by the
statutes.
This question of authorization also plagues the New York persistent
offender law. When faced with a challenge to the law in the wake of Blakely,
New York’s highest court construed the statute to make defendants “eligible for
persistent felony offender sentencing based solely on whether they had two
prior felony convictions.”200 It claimed that the statutory requirement that the
judge base her decision to increase sentences on “the opinion that the history
and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of his
criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time
supervision will best serve the public interest” was merely a “procedural rule[]”

198. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(b) (“Sentences under this section that are outside of the
presumptive ranges set out in AS 12.55.125 shall be based on the totality of the aggravating
and mitigating factors . . . .” (emphasis added)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (“In
determining what sentence to impose, the court shall take into account the amount of
aggravating circumstances and whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is
sufficiently substantial to justify the lesser term.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, prior to the
decision in Martinez, an intermediate appellate court stated “Arizona law does not
authorize an aggravated sentence upon the mere finding of one aggravating circumstance
but, rather, authorizes an aggravated sentence only if all of the aggravating circumstances
taken together outweigh the mitigating factors found by the court.” State v. Alire, 105 P.3d
163, 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Aleman, 109 P.3d 571, 581 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005) (quoting this language approvingly).
199. See Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624 (stating that, after finding a single aggravator, the judge has
“discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory sentencing range”).
200. People v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (N.Y. 2005).
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that was designed to give a defendant “a right to an airing and an explanation”
and to “facilitate the exercise” of appellate review for abuse of discretion.201
But as with the Alaska and Arizona sentencing schemes, it is difficult to
understand precisely how the New York courts have concluded that “under
New York’s scheme, a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence based
solely on the existence of two prior felony convictions.”202 While courts say that
the existence of prior felony convictions alone authorize higher sentences, they
also state:
[T]he New York sentencing scheme, after a defendant is deemed
eligible to be sentenced as a persistent felony offender, requires that
the sentencing court make a qualitative judgment about, among
other things, the defendant’s criminal history and the
circumstances surrounding a particular offense in order to
determine whether an enhanced sentence, under the statutorily
prescribed sentencing range, is warranted.203

It is difficult to understand how the statute simultaneously authorizes a higher
sentence without any further findings, while at the same time requires that
further findings be made before a judge decides to impose the higher
sentence.204
The Florida system in Hurst helps illustrate this latter point. The Florida
system empowered judges to impose the death penalty if they found that
“sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and that “there are insufficient
201. Id. at 197–98, 199 n.7.
202. People v. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (N.Y. 2009); see also Rivera, 833 N.E.2d at 197
(reading the statute to say that “the prior felony convictions”—rather than the judge’s
conclusions about the defendant and his crime—“are the sole determinant of whether a
defendant is subject to recidivist sentencing as a persistent felony offender”). As the
dissenting justices in Rivera made clear, this was a novel construction of the statute that
was articulated only to save the statute from invalidation on Sixth Amendment grounds.
See id. at 201, 202 (Kay, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute as construed by the majority was
not before today the law in New York.”). The construction does appear to have played a
determinative role in saving the statute; in upholding the statute against a Sixth
Amendment challenge, the Second Circuit relied on this characterization of the statute
from Rivera despite the subsequent New York Court of Appeals decision in Quinones
making clear that the statute’s requirement is not purely procedural. See Portalatin v.
Graham 624 F.3d 69, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc).
203. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d at 1041.
204. Perhaps this statement is meant to suggest that these additional findings about the
defendant and her crime are only intended to aid the judge in deciding whether to impose
a lower sentence—that is the sentence that the defendant would have been subject to, if not
for the prior conviction. This reading would explain why the Quinones Court capitalized
the word “under,” and it would arguably fit within various U.S. Supreme Court language
that has emphasized how the Sixth Amendment applies to facts that increase a sentence or
impose a mandatory minimum sentence, but not to facts that decrease a sentence.
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mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”205 The
judge enjoyed significant discretion in deciding whether a fact qualified as an
aggravating circumstance206 and significant discretion in deciding whether
mitigating circumstances outweighed those circumstances. But the statute
required the judge to make those findings in order to exercise that discretion,
and thus the Supreme Court held that the system was unconstitutional. The
mere existence of some discretion is not sufficient to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment; any limitation on that discretion triggers the Sixth Amendment.207
Federal sentencing is more complicated, but it also requires judges to
engage in factfinding before they impose a sentence. In the federal system, a
judge can sentence, at least in theory, anywhere within the sentencing range
without making any additional factual findings. One could argue that the
factfinding necessary to calculate the Guideline range is not “essential” for the
sentence that a defendant receives. The Supreme Court has, on occasion,
characterized the judicial factfinding as a procedural sentencing
requirement.208
But the Court also ensures that the factfinding process is an important
substantive component of sentencing through appellate review. Appellate
courts must reverse “unreasonable” sentences, and the Supreme Court has
indicated that the magnitude of difference between the Guideline range and the
sentence imposed is one feature of that substantive review.209 In particular, it
has instructed appellate courts to consider whether the sentencing court’s
explanation for sentencing outside the Guideline range is sufficiently
compelling to justify the magnitude of difference between the Guideline range
and the sentence imposed.210

205. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2015).
206. In particular, the judge would have exercised significant discretion in deciding whether a
defendant’s crime is “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Id. § 921.141(5) (h).
207. Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (“Whether the judge’s authority to
impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of
several specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that
the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority
only upon finding some additional fact.”).
208. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 50 (stating that “it [is] uncontroversial that a major departure should be
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”). This rule likely
encourages district courts that elect to sentence outside of the Guideline range not to stray
too far from that range because it tells them that appellate review of their reasoning will be
more searching. Cf. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 46, at 13, 34 (noting that this language
from Gall was in conflict with the holding in the case, which instructed appellate courts to
defer to district court sentencing decisions).
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To be sure, the Guidelines are not mandatory. Federal judges have at least
some discretion to impose sentences that do not fall within the Guideline range.
The Supreme Court ensures district court discretion by instructing sentencing
courts that they may not presume that the Guideline range contains the
appropriate sentence,211 and by allowing district courts to impose sentences
outside of the Guideline range based only on judicial disagreement with the
policies underlying the Guidelines.212 But reversals in the circuit courts make
clear that district courts do not actually possess the authority to sentence
anywhere within the statutory sentencing range. Circuit courts reverse
sentences at the top of the range in the absence of aggravating sentencing
facts,213 and they reverse sentences at the bottom of the range in the absence of
mitigating facts.214
Importantly, the current federal system is different from the other systems
discussed above. In the federal system, the judge has the authority to impose a
sentence anywhere within the sentencing range at the moment of conviction,
whereas a judge in the other systems must have a jury finding or a prior
conviction in order for the higher, aggravated portion of the range to be
available. But it is not entirely clear why this difference should matter for Sixth
Amendment purposes. We could, for example, analogize the Alaska and
Arizona systems to a separate, aggravated offense that broadens the sentencing
range—that is to say, we could treat the jury finding or prior conviction as if the
defendant had been convicted of a different crime than defendants without
such findings or convictions.215 If we use that analogy, then the state defendant
with a jury finding or a prior conviction looks no different than a federal

211. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350 (2009).
212. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). Several of the Court’s opinions have
included dicta suggesting that certain policy disagreements could trigger heightened
appellate review. See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264–65 (2009) (per curiam)
(disagreeing with the crack-powder cocaine guideline differential); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at
574–75 (same). Such review could raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns under the
Court’s pre–Hurst doctrine. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 742–44 (2009). But because the
Court has never actually endorsed such heightened review, we do not consider it here.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Castro Juarez, 425 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2005). Importantly, the
circuits appear to be more willing to reverse below-Guidelines sentences than aboveGuidelines sentences. See Douglas A. Berman, Tracking Reasonableness Review
Outcomes . . . Final Update?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (July 31, 2006), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/07/tracking_reason.html [http://perma.cc/MW45-TW2Y].
214. See, e.g., United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Carissa Byrne
Hessick, Child Pornography Sentencing in the Sixth Circuit, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381,
400–02 (2016) (raising Sixth Amendment concerns about appellate sentencing reversals).
215. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 107–109.

Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst

493

defendant in the current system. Both defendants are supposedly subject to any
punishment that falls within the range; but the judge cannot impose any
sentence without first making factual findings. It is hard to see how the Sixth
Amendment ought to apply differently to these two defendants.
There is, perhaps, another way to distinguish the federal defendant from
the defendants in Alaska and Arizona—namely, the federal judge’s ability to
make sentencing decisions based on policy disagreements with the Guidelines.
Alaska and Arizona require judges to impose sentences based on the presence
or absence of aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors.216 In contrast,
federal judges, in theory, can base decisions on their own policy preferences.217
Imagine, for example, a federal judge who disagrees with the policy
decisions underlying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ranges associated with
drugs. Those Guidelines instruct the judge to calculate a range based on, inter
alia, the amount of drugs that the defendant trafficked.218 As a result, the presentence report that the judge receives will include evidence about the amount
of drugs involved in the defendant’s crime. A judge, though, could announce
that she is not going to consider that information. She could decide that she
thinks the Guidelines are too harsh when it comes to drug crimes, and she
could elect to impose the average sentence received by state drug defendants in
the state in which she sits (assuming that sentence is within the relevant federal
range). Under the Booker remedy, the federal judge has the authority (at least
in theory) to impose such a sentence. But judges in Alaska and Arizona do not
appear to have such authority. Their factual findings must inform their
sentencing decisions, whereas the federal judge is free to sentence based on
policy considerations alone.
This distinction between the federal system and the Alaska and Arizona
systems matters for Sixth Amendment purposes. In particular, it demonstrates
that federal judges may entirely disregard factual findings—especially if they
may even decline to make those findings in the first instance—which means
that the factfinding process is arguably not required. And it is only required
factual findings that run afoul of Hurst.
The problem with this distinction is that, while it may exist in theory, it is
unclear whether federal judges possess this sort of authority in practice. Federal

216. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.155(b) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(F) (2017);
supra text accompanying note 198.
217. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 198–202 (2014) (describing the different amounts and types
of discretion in various sentencing systems).
218. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
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appellate courts have the authority to review all federal sentences for
“reasonableness,” and it is unclear whether those appellate courts would say
that it is reasonable for a district court judge to impose a sentence without
considering the Guidelines’ advisory range.219 Various post-Booker Supreme
Court cases appear to require judges to make factual findings and to consider
the Guidelines when selecting sentences.220 Indeed, some circuit courts appear
to police district court decisions to sentence outside of the Guidelines rather
closely.221 To the extent those courts routinely reverse sentencing decisions that
are based only on policy considerations, it may not be possible to distinguish
the federal sentencing system from the Alaska and Arizona sentencing systems
on anything other than theoretical grounds.
Importantly, a recent Supreme Court case on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines—Beckles v. United States222—may suggest a shift in federal law that
could save the federal system from a post-Hurst challenge. Beckles involved the
question of whether the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vague laws
applied to the advisory Guidelines.223 The Court held that it did not.224 The
majority opinion explained that the vagueness doctrine did not apply, in part,
because although the Guidelines “continue to guide district courts in exercising
their discretion,” the Guidelines “‘do not constrain th[at] discretion.’”225 The
Beckles opinion is notable because the idea that the Guidelines do not constrain
judicial sentencing discretion came not from any of the Court’s majority
opinions, but rather from one of Justice Thomas’s post-Booker dissents. If
Beckles signals a shift in the Court’s post-Booker approach to federal
sentencing—that is to say, if the Court begins to treat the Guidelines as purely
voluntary226—then it will be much easier to separate the federal system from the

219. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
347–48, 350–51 (2007).
220. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 548–49 (2013) (suggesting that district
courts commit procedural error if they fail to consult the Guidelines and if they deviate too
far from the advisory range without a “sufficiently compelling” justification); Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51 (suggesting that appellate courts should reverse sentencing for “procedural
unreasonableness” if the sentencing judge failed to perform the Guidelines calculation).
221. See supra note 214.
222. 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
223. Id. The Court has held that vague statutes are unconstitutional because they fail to
“provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” United States
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56
(1999) (noting that vague statutes can lead to arbitrary enforcement).
224. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894.
225. Id. (quoting Peugh, 569 U.S. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
226. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 217, at 217–18, 218 n.174 (distinguishing the current
federal system from a purely voluntary guideline system).
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state systems that run afoul of Hurst. Federal judges will enjoy the “broad
discretion” that the Court has repeatedly said does not trigger the Sixth
Amendment.227
2.

Preserving a Distinction Between Sentencing “Requirements”
and the Ultimate Selection of Sentence

The decision to impose a higher sentence, once such a sentence has been
authorized, is difficult to separate from the decision about the precise sentence
to impose. In light of this, some courts have argued that these nonauthorization
factual findings do not fall within the Sixth Amendment jury right.228 To do
otherwise, so the argument goes, would essentially require jury sentencing.229
But this difficulty in separating the decision of whether to increase a
sentence from the decision about the ultimate sentence is not insurmountable.
So long as judges choose to engage in that factfinding of their own accord,
and so long as the statute does not limit their discretion to impose a sentence
based on what facts they find, then the judicial factfinding does not trigger the
Sixth Amendment.230 And focusing on whether statutory requirements limit
judicial discretion, rather than whether a particular factfinding “authorizes” a
sentence, provides an administrable standard. Perhaps, more importantly, it
avoids the possibility of legislatures drafting around the Sixth Amendment.

227. See infra note 234.
228. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 533–34 (N.M. 2005); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604,
626–27 (Neb. 2003).
229. Id.
230. Colorado’s capital sentencing system provides an example of how a jurisdiction separates
distinguishes qualitative determinations from the ultimate selection of sentence. As Sam
Kamin and Justin Marceau explain:
The Colorado capital sentencing statute has been interpreted to require four
distinct steps at the penalty phase. First, the jury must find one of seventeen
enumerated aggravating factors to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. Second,
the jury considers evidence proffered by the defendant to determine “whether
any mitigating factor exists.” Third, the prosecution is permitted to rebut the
presented mitigating evidence and the jury is to assess whether the mitigating
evidence outweighs the aggravating factors found by the jury. Only if the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigation does not outweigh the
aggravating factor(s) previously found does the case proceed to the fourth
stage at which the jury is presented with additional evidence and ultimately
makes a decision as to whether death is the appropriate punishment.

Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1017
(2015) (footnotes omitted) (quoting People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990)
(en banc)). Although Colorado has a jury perform each of these steps, the fourth step
could be given to a judge without running afoul of Hurst, because this step does not require
any factfinding. See discussion supra Part II.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no Sixth Amendment
right to a jury determination of the ultimate sentence.231 Although the cases
that state this rule are of a relatively recent vintage,232 we would be surprised if
the Court were to suddenly discover an absolute right to jury sentencing—that
is, a right to have a jury decide the ultimate sentence to impose on a defendant
in every case.
There is a long history of judicial sentencing in this country.233 In all of the
cases that expanded the right to jury findings at sentencing, the Court has been
quite adamant that judges may find sentencing facts if those facts will allow
them to exercise their sentencing discretion.234 The repeated acknowledgement

231. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 49 (1995) (“Our cases have made abundantly clear
that a defendant does not enjoy a constitutional right to a jury determination as to the
appropriate sentence to be imposed.”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)
(“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns
on specific findings of fact.”); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986) (“The decision
whether a particular punishment . . . is appropriate in any given case is not one that we
have ever required to be made by a jury.”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)
(“[D]espite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same
fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding—a determination of the
appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual. The Sixth Amendment never has
been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of that issue.” (citations
omitted)).
232. Although the Apprendi line of cases has overruled several cases in which the Supreme
Court held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the ultimate
sentence, it still seems unlikely that the Court would find that defendants have such a right.
McMillan and Spaziano have been explicitly overruled. See Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. 99, 105–07, 116 (noting that much of the holding from McMillan had been overruled
by Apprendi, a narrow aspect of the holding had been upheld by Harris v. United States,
536 U.S. 545 (2002), and overruling Harris); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 623 (2016)
(overruling Spaziano). And some judges have questioned whether Bullock survived
Apprendi. See infra text accompanying note 245.
233. See, e.g., State v. Reeder, 60 S.E. 434, 435 (S.C. 1908) (“The American cases lay down the
principle that, where it devolves upon the court to determine the punishment either upon
the finding or upon the plea of guilty, it is the correct practice for it to hear evidence in
aggravation or mitigation, as the case may be, where there is any discretion as to the
punishment.”); Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 403 (1876) (“According to the old law, all the
jury had to do was to determine the question of guilt or innocence. It was the duty of the
court, after a verdict of guilty, to declare the punishment which the law imposed. If any
discretion was permitted as to the punishment, that discretion was exercised by the court
alone.”); see also Iontcheva, supra note 100, at 316–23 (noting that only a few states had
jury sentencing in early America).
234. See, e.g., Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116 (“[B]road sentencing discretion, informed by judicial
factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); Booker v. United States, 543 U.S.
220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. . . . [W]hen a trial judge
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant
has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (“We should be clear that nothing in this history
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that judicial factfinding is constitutional if it assists in judicial sentencing
discretion would make no sense if all judicial sentencing were itself
unconstitutional. In other words, in limiting the Sixth Amendment right to
jury findings in sentencing schemes that restrict judicial sentencing discretion,
the Supreme Court has, by implication, affirmed the constitutionality of
judicial sentencing. And if judicial sentencing is constitutional, then the Sixth
Amendment does not require jury sentencing.
But the repeated affirmance of the constitutionality of judicial sentencing
discretion can also serve to bolster our reading of Hurst and to save it from the
concern that it is impossible to disentangle postauthorization factfinding from
selection of the ultimate sentence. Hurst relies on the very foundation that the
Court has repeatedly used to invoke or avoid the Sixth Amendment—judicial
discretion.235 Thus, Hurst recognizes a jury right only for findings required
before a judge may impose a particular sentence. It does not recognize a jury
right for findings that are part of a judge’s unfettered sentencing discretion.
Hurst requires a jury only for those factual findings required by statute or by
constitutional doctrine. If a judge is truly free to increase a sentence without
any factual findings at all, then the Sixth Amendment does not apply. In this
way, Hurst does not upset the rule that the Sixth Amendment does not create a
right to jury sentencing; it merely continues to impose a jury requirement when
sentencing discretion is removed from judges.
C.

Judicial Findings That Survive Hurst

Those familiar with capital sentencing will have noticed two glaring
exceptions to the preceding discussion about sentencing systems that require
judicial factfinding: (1) the findings required to impose the death penalty on
defendants convicted of felony murder and (2) the Ohio capital punishment
system for defendants who plead guilty. While both of these sentencing
regimes require judicial factfinding, they may still be permissible in the wake of
Hurst. That is because there are constitutional doctrines at play other than the
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine, and those other doctrines complicate
the constitutional question.

suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into
consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a
judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this
country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory
limits in the individual case.”).
235. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 217, at 203–05.
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Hurst and Felony Murder

The Supreme Court has recognized some Eighth Amendment limits
on the ability of states to impose capital sentences for felony murder—that
is, homicides that occur during the course of a felony, rather than intentional
homicides.236 Enmund v. Florida237 held the imposition of the death penalty for
felony murder violated the Eighth Amendment because the state failed to prove
that the defendant had killed or attempted to kill.238 Tison v. Arizona,239 by
contrast, narrowed the holding of Enmund by finding that felony murder could
serve as the basis for a death sentence in certain cases and not violate the Eighth
Amendment.240 Specifically, the Tison court held that individuals who are
major participants in a crime and who demonstrate reckless indifference could
receive the death penalty, even if they did not kill or attempt to kill the victim.241
After deciding Enmund and Tison, but before Apprendi, the Court denied
a Sixth Amendment challenge to the ability of a judge to make determinations
required by Enmund and Tison.242 Defendants argued that the Enmund and
Tison factors were elements, like aggravating factors, and so the Sixth
Amendment required a jury to find them.243 The Court rejected this challenge,
holding that these determinations were an additional constitutional limitation
under the Eighth Amendment, and they did not constitute an element of capital
felony murder.244
Even after Apprendi, lower courts have largely held that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a jury determination of the Enmund and Tison
felony murder requirements.245 Courts distinguished the facts required in
236. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 449–60 (1985) (recounting the history
and major justifications for the felony murder doctrine).
237. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
238. Id. at 797.
239. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
240. Id. at 157–58.
241. See id. at 158.
242. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 381 (1986).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 385.
245. See, e.g., People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 572 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Galindo, 774
N.W.2d 190, 236 (Neb. 2009); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003);
State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 946 (Ariz. 2003); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 26.4(i), at 1018–19 (4th ed. 2015) (“So far, lower courts have rejected
arguments to equate the factors which as a matter of Eighth Amendment law are required
for death eligibility with elements. The rules in Tison and Atkins have instead been treated
as defenses to, not elements of, capital murder.”). Notably, some judges have questioned
whether Cabana v. Bullock survived Apprendi. See Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011,
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Apprendi from the Enmund and Tison facts in several ways. First, courts
described the Enmund and Tison facts—whether a defendant’s participation in
a felony murder made him eligible for the death penalty—as “constitutional
facts,” as opposed to facts that were an element of the crime.246 The second
distinction is that Enmund and Tison facts were mitigating—facts that excluded
one from eligibility for a sentence, as opposed to prerequisites for inclusion in
the group able to receive a sentence.
Although we see no relevant distinction between elements and
“constitutional facts,”247 characterizing Enmund and Tison findings as a
mitigation issue complicates the Sixth Amendment question. That is because
the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine applies only to findings that
increase a defendant’s sentence, not to findings that decrease a sentence. In this
respect, the Enmund and Tison findings could bear more of a resemblance to a
defense than to an element of a crime. The Supreme Court has sometimes
applied different Sixth Amendment standards to defenses and elements.248
Most notably, while the Court has required the prosecution to prove all
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,249 it has permitted states to
impose the burden of proof on defendants for affirmative defenses.250 There are
serious reasons to doubt whether that line of cases can be squared with
Apprendi and its progeny,251 but that issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
and Hurst does not really speak to that question.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

1057 (D. Neb. 2003) (finding that the Sixth Amendment required a jury finding on the
Enmund/Tison factors), rev’d on other grounds, 408 F.3d 423, 441 (8th Cir. 2005); In re
Coley, 283 P.3d 1252, 1282 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., concurring) (“Booker further suggests the
absence of any bright line limiting Apprendi’s applicability to essential facts established by
a legislative enactment.”). See generally Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and
Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553
(2015) (exploring the intersection between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments).
See, e.g., Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385; State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 945 (2003).
See supra text accompanying notes 88–90.
See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233
(1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205–06 (1977).
Compare PFAFF, supra note 37, at 321 (noting the tension between Mullaney, Patterson,
and Apprendi), with King & Klein, supra note 10, at 1478 (“[T]he holding in Apprendi
leaves intact In re Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur, as well as Leland v. Oregon, Patterson v.
New York, and Martin v. Ohio.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Ohio and Plea Bargaining

Ohio typically sentences offenders by jury in capital cases.252 But if a
defendant pleads guilty to aggravated murder, then Ohio law assigns the
sentencing decision to a three-judge panel rather than a jury.253 In State v.
Belton,254 the Ohio Supreme Court defended this sentencing scheme against a
Sixth Amendment challenge from a defendant who had pleaded no contest to
aggravated murder.255 The Belton Court reasoned, in part, that because
defendants have no right to plead guilty or no contest, the state could condition
the acceptance of such a plea upon the waiver of sentencing by a jury.256 But the
Belton Court also defended its statutory scheme on Sixth Amendment grounds.
It noted that the defendant pleaded no contest, not only to the charge of
aggravated murder, but also to two “death specifications”—that is, two aggravating
circumstances.257 It was the presence of these two circumstances that made the
defendant eligible for the death penalty, and so all the panel of judges needed to
do was “hear the mitigating evidence presented by the defense and identify any
factors that militate against a sentence of death. Then the panel must determine
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt.”258
In concluding that this process did not violate the Sixth Amendment, the
Belton Court focused on the eligibility question. It said that, because the “the
determination of guilt of an aggravating circumstance renders the defendant
eligible for a capital sentence,” any factfinding that occurred during the
selection phase did not trigger the Sixth Amendment. Because the defendant
was already eligible for the death sentence, additional factual findings did not
“expose a defendant to greater punishment.”259

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 2018).
Id.
74 N.E.3d 319 (Ohio 2016).
Id.
Id. at 334–35.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 337. The Belton Court also distinguished weighing from factfinding. “Weighing is
not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment . . . . Instead, the weighing
process amounts to ‘a complex moral judgment’ about what penalty to impose upon a
defendant who is already death-penalty eligible.” Id. (quoting United States v. Runyon,
707 F.3d 475, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2013)). Although we believe that weighing, if required to
impose a sentence, may trigger the Sixth Amendment, see infra Subpart IV.B, this Ohio
scheme may nonetheless be constitutional because there is no right to a plea bargain, see
infra text accompanying notes 261–267.
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Even though the Sixth Amendment “eligibility” analysis in Belton relies on
the same flawed “authorization” argument that has been used by Arizona,
Alaska, and other states, Ohio’s system may nonetheless be constitutional.
That is because the judicial sentencing process is limited to those defendants
who plead guilty or no contest. Because courts have not recognized a right to
enter a guilty plea,260 there are few (if any) limitations on the rights that a
defendant may waive.261 Prosecutors routinely require defendants to waive a
large number of rights in plea bargains, including the right to trial by jury.262 So
long as Ohio can require a defendant to waive her right to a jury trial in toto,
and so long as courts are unwilling to place restrictions on what rights the
government may require a defendant to waive in return for a plea bargain,263
then the Ohio system is constitutional. That is to say, Ohio defendants have a
right to insist that a jury make the relevant death penalty determinations. But if
they wish to invoke that right, then they must also proceed to trial on the
question of guilt and death eligibility.
Recently, a unanimous Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in
Belton and concluded that its capital system did not violate the Sixth
Amendment.264 Looking at the role of the jury in capital cases, the Court
explained that the jury, unlike in Ring and Hurst, was required to make the final
factual finding with respect to the aggravating factor(s) mandated by the
statute.265 As the Court explained, “Ohio law requires the critical jury findings
that were not required by the laws at issue in Ring and Hurst.”266
IV.

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS AND THE JURY RIGHT

It is quite clear that Hurst expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine by eliminating the distinction between facts that “authorize” a
sentencing increase and other factual findings required to impose a sentence.

260. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“There is, of course, no absolute right to
have a guilty plea accepted.”).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (upholding waiver of right to know
about impeachment evidence).
262. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 92 (2015)
(reporting that “a significant number of prosecutors seek waivers of all statutory and
constitutional claims regardless of whether such violations occurred pre-trial, during the
entry of a guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing, or thereafter”).
263. See id. at 78–83.
264. State v. Mason, 108 N.E.3d 56 (Ohio 2018).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 8. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(C)(2).
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But it may also have expanded the doctrine beyond findings of historical facts.
Although Apprendi and Ring both suggest that a jury is necessary only for
factual findings, Hurst also seems to characterize the finding of whether
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors as a factual determination that
triggers the Sixth Amendment. In holding the Florida death penalty scheme
unconstitutional, the Hurst Court mentioned that the judge not only had to
engage in factfinding, but also had to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors:
“The trial court alone must find ‘the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating
circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’”267 In other words, Hurst suggests
that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors should not have been
assigned to the judge.
To be sure, this is not the only plausible reading of Hurst. The Florida
statute at issue in Hurst labeled the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
factors a “fact.”268 So, it is possible to read the Court’s opinion as simply
repeating the statutory language, rather than independently characterizing the
weighing determination as a factual finding. Nor did the Court indicate
whether the statute would have violated the Sixth Amendment if it only
required the judge to make the weighing determination, as opposed to first
determining whether aggravating factors were present. Nonetheless, it is
possible to read this language in Hurst as eliminating a distinction between
factual findings that increase a sentence and other types of required findings,
including those that might be characterized as “findings of law.”
As a general matter, the line between findings of fact and findings of law is
far from clear.269 And in the sentencing context, many systems rely on
aggravating factors that resemble mixed questions of law and fact, rather than
pure questions of historical fact. Indeed, Minnesota recently relied on the lawfact distinction in order to characterize its aggravating sentencing factors as
legal questions that do not require jury findings.270 Minnesota’s approach
267. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016) (quoting Act of Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96, sec.
921.141, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 1352, 1353).
268. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2015), 1996 Fla. Laws at 1353. The relevant text read:
[I]f the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its
findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist . . . and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2015).

269. See discussion supra Subpart II.A.
270. See State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 2009), which is discussed in more detail
infra text accompanying notes 324–333.
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demonstrates how distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of
law at the sentencing stage can be inconsistent with treating aggravating
sentencing factors as the functional equivalent of elements of a crime. Criminal
offenses routinely include elements that appear to be questions of law, rather
than questions of fact, such as whether a defendant’s actions were “reasonable”
or whether certain information was “material.” There is little doubt that juries,
rather than judges, must answer those questions to prevent states from
circumventing the jury requirement.271
If we read Hurst to extend the Sixth Amendment jury right beyond
questions of historical fact to include any findings that are required by law, that
calls into question the constitutionality of a number of sentencing systems.
That is because many systems require judges to weigh aggravating sentencing
factors against mitigating factors and to make other qualitative judgments
before increasing sentences. Indeed, all of the sentencing systems identified in
Part III that require additional judicial factfinding do so in order to have the
judge make a qualitative determination. This Part begins by identifying
additional jurisdictions that require weighing or other qualitative findings
before a judge may increase a sentence. And it explains how those systems may
run afoul of Hurst.
A.

Cataloging Sentencing Systems That Require Weighing and Other
Qualitative Findings

Several state sentencing schemes require judges to make a qualitative
finding before imposing an increased sentence. Some states require judges to
weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and conclude that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances before
increasing a sentence. Other states require judges to make a less clearly defined
qualitative determination, such as whether the aggravating circumstances are
“extraordinary,” before imposing an increased sentence. In addition, the
Eighth Amendment may require a qualitative finding prior to the imposition of
juvenile life without parole sentences after the recent decisions in Miller v.
Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana.

271. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (requiring jury to assess materiality
of false statements).
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Minnesota

In non–death penalty cases, Minnesota judges must impose a sentence
within the state sentencing guidelines’ presumptive range. Judges may depart
from the guidelines and impose a sentence above or below the presumptive
guideline range only if “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a sentence outside” of the presumptive range.272
When a judge sentences outside of the presumptive range, she must “disclose in
writing or on the record the particular substantial and compelling
circumstances that make the departure more appropriate than the presumptive
sentence.”273 A judge may impose a sentence outside of the presumptive range
“only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present.”274 The state
guidelines include a nonexclusive list of aggravating and mitigating “departure
factors.”275 As the guidelines’ commentary explains, “the aggravating or
mitigating factors and the written reasons supporting the departure must be
substantial and compelling to overcome the presumption in favor of the
Guideline’s sentence.”276
After the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington,277 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that its sentencing system violated the Sixth
Amendment.278 Minnesota cured the defect by providing for sentencing juries
to find aggravating factors.279 And the relevant state statute contemplates that
the jury findings be made in one of two possible ways: (1) Either the “existence
of each aggravating factor shall be determined by use of a special verdict form”
submitted to the jury at the time that they decide on guilt or innocence, or (2)
the court “shall bifurcate the proceedings, or impanel a resentencing jury, to
allow for the production of evidence, argument, and deliberations on the
existence of factors in support of an aggravated departure after the return of a
guilty verdict.”280 In other words, Minnesota appeared to have addressed the
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine by providing for a jury to make all of the
factual findings necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence.
272. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.1 (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N 2017).
273. Id. § 2.D.1(c).
274. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 140 (Minn. 2005) (quoting State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d
426, 427 (Minn. 1989)).
275. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.3 (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N 2017); see
also id. § 2.D.1(d) (describing this list of factors as “advisory”).
276. Id. § 2.D.1 cmt. 2.D.103.
277. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
278. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 141–42 (Minn. 2005), as amended on reh’g in part (Oct. 6, 2005).
279. MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2016); State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 29 (Minn. 2006).
280. MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5) (2016).
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But a 2009 Minnesota Supreme Court opinion, State v. Rourke,281
complicated the Sixth Amendment question. The defendant had been given an
aggravated sentence based on a finding that he had treated the victim with
“particular cruelty” when he committed assault.282 “Particular cruelty” is an
aggravating factor that is enumerated in both the state sentencing guidelines
and state statute.283 In resolving a dispute over whether this factor was
unconstitutionally vague, the Rourke Court held that “particular cruelty” was a
reason that supported the trial court’s decision to impose a sentence above the
presumptive range, rather than an additional fact to be found by a jury.284 The
Court identified as an example of such facts whether the defendant handcuffed
the victim and sprayed her with chemicals.285 Such “additional facts, which
were neither admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of
the offense,” the Rourke Court explained, must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.286 But once those facts are found, the judge alone must make
the decision whether those additional facts constitute “particular cruelty,”
which would warrant an aggravated sentence.287
2.

Ohio

In Ohio, the death penalty statute allows the defendant to choose a jury or
a three-judge panel to try and sentence the case.288 If a defendant chooses a jury,
the jury must find the defendant guilty of aggravated murder, with one or more
capital specifications, to be eligible for death.289 If the jury makes such a finding
at trial, the court will then hold a sentencing hearing in which the jury will
consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence, weigh that evidence, and
recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment.290 If the jury recommends
death, then the court must then weigh the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances itself in deciding whether to accept or reject the jury’s
recommendation.291 This weighing determination, as explained above, could

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009).
Id. at 916–17.
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.3(b)(2) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5)(a)(2) (2016).
Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920–22.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 921.
Id.; MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.D.3(b)(2) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5)(a)(2)
(2016).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04 (West 2018).
See id. § 2929.03.
See id.
See id.
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violate the Sixth Amendment because it conditions the receipt of a death
sentence on a final qualitative determination made by a judge, not a jury.
In Ohio v. Mason,292 a 2018 case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
qualitative determination by a judge was not a factual finding for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment.293 The Court further opined that even if it were a factual
finding, it was a different kind of finding than the one prohibited by the
Supreme Court in Hurst.294 The weighing by the trial judge did not determine
the question of death, according to the court; the jury’s recommendation did.295
The Court also suggested that the Hurst issue did not exist because the Court
had no authority to increase the recommended sentence.296 The Court ignored,
however, the requirement that the judge affirm the death sentence in order for
it to be imposed. Without the judicial qualitative weighing determination, the
defendant could not receive the punishment of death. Thus, the availability of
the death sentence is conditioned upon a judge’s finding. As in Hurst, the jury
determination in Ohio is necessary, but not sufficient, for a defendant to receive
a death sentence. The only difference between the regime in Hurst and in Ohio
is that the judge in Ohio does not find aggravating facts, but instead weighs
those facts. As such, we question the correctness of the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision in Mason in light of Hurst.
3.

Nebraska

The Nebraska death statute consists of multiple phases. There is a
separate hearing between the guilt and sentencing phases to determine whether
one or more aggravating circumstances are present.297 The jury must find each
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury’s finding
must be unanimous.298 If the jury finds no aggravating factors, the defendant
receives a life sentence.299 If a jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance,
then the case proceeds to a sentencing hearing.300 At the sentencing hearing,
three judges “receive evidence of mitigation and sentence excessiveness or
disproportionality.”301 It appears that the judges may consider aggravating
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

108 N.E.3d 56 (Ohio 2018).
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520(1) (2016).
Id. § 29-2520(4)(f).
Id. § 29-2520(4)(h).
Id.
Id. § 29-2520(4)(h); Id. § 29-2521(1), (3).
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facts that are not found by the jury at the eligibility hearing;302 and it is
quite clear that the judges must base their sentencing determination on a
weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as a judgment about
whether
a
sentence
of
death
would
be
“excessive
or
303
disproportionate . . . considering both the crime and the defendant.”
The Nebraska scheme appears to be unconstitutional after Hurst. The
scheme relies on a jury finding of “eligibility” for the death penalty based on
factual findings about whether aggravating circumstances exist. But a jury’s
finding of the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances is not the
only finding that the statute requires to impose the death penalty. The statute
also requires the judges to make two qualitative findings: (1) “Whether
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the weight
given to the aggravating circumstances” and (2) “[w]hether the sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.”304
Notably, in the wake of Ring, the Nebraska Supreme Court entertained a
Sixth Amendment challenge on precisely this ground. In State v. Gales,305 the
court rejected a defendant’s argument that the statutory scheme “fails to meet
the Sixth Amendment requirements defined in Apprendi v. New Jersey, because
302. The judges are permitted to consider information in a presentence report that is prepared
after the finding of death-eligibility, id. § 29-2521(2); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 627
(Neb. 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of judges considering such a presentencing
investigation and report “only in the selection phase of the capital sentencing”), and the
judges are permitted to hear any evidence “which the presiding judge deems to have
probative value” about the question of mitigation and the question whether a death
sentence would be excessive or disproportionate, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521(3) (2016).
While the statutory scheme appears to permit the judges to consider additional
aggravating circumstances above and beyond those found by the jury, it may also require
the judges to make their own findings about the existence of aggravating factors. The
statute that directs judges how to determine whether death is an appropriate sentence does
not refer to the jury’s death-eligibility finding as a limitation on the aggravating
circumstances that the panel should consider. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (“In each case,
the determination of the panel of judges shall be in writing and refer to the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances weighed in the determination of the panel.”); id. § 29-2522 (1)
(“[The] sentence determination shall be based upon the following considerations: (1)
Whether the aggravating circumstances as determined to exist justify imposition of a
sentence of death . . . .”). One could read this language to direct judges to make their own
findings about the existence of aggravating circumstances, or one could read it to permit
such findings. If it requires judges to make their own, independent findings about the
existence of additional aggravating circumstances, then the Nebraska scheme raises the
same Sixth Amendment problems as the Alaska and Arizona sentencing schemes
discussed in Part III.
303. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(2), (3) (2016).
304. Id.
305. 658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003).
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[it] does not authorize a jury to weigh aggravating circumstances against
mitigating circumstances or conduct a proportionality review prior to the
determination of the sentence.”306 The Gales Court noted that Ring did not
address weighing at sentencing.307 And it went on to defend the Nebraska
system by distinguishing the determination of “death eligibility” from the
weighing and proportionality determinations, stating that the former is what
subjects the defendant to the increased sentence, while the latter “[is] part of the
‘selection decision’ in capital sentencing, which, under the current and prior
statutes, occurs only after eligibility has been determined.”308 In other words,
the Gales Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury
determination of every required finding.
Although it rejected this argument in the wake of Ring, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has not addressed the argument in the wake of Hurst. To date,
the only post-Hurst challenge to Nebraska’s capital sentencing scheme came in
State v. Vela.309 Vela, however, did not raise the claim in his petition for
postconviction relief in the state district court, so the Nebraska Supreme Court
declined to consider it on appeal.310
4.

North Carolina

North Carolina has a presumptive noncapital sentencing system. It
requires a jury to make all factual findings for sentencing determinations other
than the fact of a prior conviction311 But the jury’s factual findings, standing
alone, are not enough to justify a sentence above the presumptive range. The
judge must also find that those aggravating factors “are sufficient to outweigh
any mitigating factors that are present.”312 In other words, North Carolina
requires the judge to make the qualitative determination about the relative
weight of aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors in order to increase the
defendants’ sentence above the presumptive range.313

Id. at 626 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
900 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 2017).
Id. at 14.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(b) (2017) (requiring a jury finding of aggravating factors or
a judicial finding of aggravation under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d) (12a) or (18a),
which identify a judicial finding of probation violation and a prior adjudication of
delinquency, respectively, as aggravating factors).
312. Id. § 15A-1340.16(b).
313. State v. Facyson, 758 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. 2014) (“Our Structured Sentencing Act
provides that if the jury finds that one or more aggravating factors exist, and if the trial

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
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Colorado, Kansas, Oregon, and Washington

Several states require judges to make nonweighing qualitative
determinations in order to increase noncapital sentences.314 Kansas, for
example, requires juries to make all factual findings other than the fact of a
prior conviction.315 But the jury’s factual findings, standing alone, are not
enough to justify a sentence above the presumptive range; the judge must
also determine whether there are “substantial and compelling reasons to
impose a departure sentence.”316 In other words, Kansas requires a
qualitative determination by the judge about whether the facts found by
the jury are “substantial and compelling reasons” to increase the
defendants’ sentence above the presumptive range.
Colorado,317

314.

315.
316.
317.

court determines that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, then the
court may impose a sentence in the statutorily-prescribed aggravated range.”).
The New York persistent offender law has this problem. The New York Court of Appeals
acknowledges that the persistent offender law “requires that the sentencing court make a
qualitative judgment about, among other things, the defendant’s criminal history and the
circumstances surrounding a particular offense in order to determine whether an
enhanced sentence . . . is warranted.” People v. Quinones, 906 N.E.2d 1033, 1041 (N.Y.
2009) (emphasis added). Because New York also requires judges to make factual findings,
their sentencing systems violate the Sixth Amendment even under a narrower reading of
Hurst. In cases in which a New York judge did not find additional facts, see supra text
accompanying notes 171, 202–204, then this qualitative judgment requirement could still
raise Sixth Amendment problems.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(b) (2017).
Id. § 21-6815(a).
Colorado requires judges to impose a sentence within a presumptive range unless an
aggravating factor is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or unless there are
aggravating factors that otherwise satisfy Blakely. Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 716
(Colo. 2005). But the factfinding is not the end of the inquiry. Judges can sentence outside
of the presumptive range only if they conclude “extraordinary mitigating or aggravating
circumstances are present.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) (2017).
Importantly, the Colorado cases interpreting this statute are unclear. The leading cases
have alternatively framed the question whether an aggravating circumstance is
“extraordinary” as a question of law in the discretion of the trial court, Lopez, 113 P.3d at
726 n.11 (“We do not hold that a defendant must admit that relevant facts are
extraordinary aggravating circumstances. We conclude that this determination is a
conclusion of law that remains within the discretion of the trial court if it is based on
Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt facts.”), and as a reservation of sentencing
discretion—namely, the decision whether to stay within the presumptive range or to
increase the sentence—that is not subject to appellate review. See People v. Leske, 957 P.2d
1030, 1044–45 (Colo. 1998) (“We have never imposed the additional requirement that,
before a sentencing court may consider psychological or other adverse impacts of a crime
on victims and their families as an extraordinary aggravating circumstance, there must be
evidence that the impact is greater than that which is ‘normally’ experienced. Such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the legislative intent that sentencing courts be
granted broad discretion in distinguishing between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’
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Oregon,318 and Washington319 have similar requirements, as do the Alaska,
Arizona, and New York systems described above in Part III.
circumstances depending upon the specific facts of each case.” (citation omitted)); see also
Lopez, 113 P.3d at 725 (“[T]he General Assembly intended to provide trial judges with
discretion that would maximize defendants’ chances for a fair and individualized
sentence.”); id. (citing Leske for the proposition that “the General Assembly intended the
trial judge to maintain discretion to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary
factors and ‘exercise its independent judgment’ in making that distinction”). This
apparent inconsistency has significant Sixth Amendment consequences. If judges are
required to make the “extraordinary” determination in order to sentence above the
presumptive range, then Colorado is not different than Kansas, Oregon, and Washington.
But if the statute does nothing more than signal that judges are free to continue to sentence
within the presumptive range even if the jury finds an aggravating factor, then there is no
“statutory requirement” that could trigger the Sixth Amendment under Hurst.
318. An Oregon defendant is entitled to have a jury to make all factual findings that would
increase a sentence above the presumptive range. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.669 (2017)
(providing that the sentencing guidelines “shall control the sentences for all crimes
committed,” and that the guidelines “shall be mandatory and constitute presumptive
sentences”); id. § 136.770 (explaining how to prove aggravating factors that “relat[e] to an
offense charged in the accusatory instrument”); id. § 136.773 (explaining how to prove
aggravating factors that “relat[e] to the defendant”); see also State v. Speedis, 256 P.3d 1061,
1064 (Or. 2011) (describing the “procedures for determining whether, in a particular case,
an aggravating factor exists that will warrant an enhanced sentence”). But the statute
makes clear that, whether an aggravated sentence may be imposed depends on whether the
sentencing judge “finds there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation
from the presumptive sentence.” OR. REV. STAT. § 137.671(1) (2017). In other words, as
the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, “it is the court, not the jury that makes the
ultimate decision whether aggravating or mitigating facts justify a sentence beyond or
below the presumptive range.” State v. Upton, 125 P.3d 713, 719 (Or. 2005) (en banc); see
also id. at 718 (“Under Blakely, the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to have a jury
determine any aggravating factor that a court may then use to justify a sentence that
exceeds the presumptive range. Nothing in Blakely precludes a sentencing court from
deciding whether jury-determined aggravating factors constitute a substantial and
compelling reason to impose a sentence that exceeds the presumptive range.”).
319. A Washington defendant is entitled to have a jury make all factual findings that would
increase a sentence above the presumptive range. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(3) (2016)
(“The facts supporting aggravating circumstances shall be proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury’s verdict on the aggravating factor must be unanimous, and by
special interrogatory. If a jury is waived, proof shall be to the court beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to the aggravating facts.”). But the sentencing
statute makes clear that it is not simply the existence of an aggravating factor that
authorizes an exceptional sentence, but rather a finding by the sentencing judge “that the
facts found are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” Id.
§ 9.94A.537(6) (“If the jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, one or
more of the facts alleged by the state in support of an aggravated sentence, the court may
sentence the offender pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535 to a term of confinement up to the
maximum allowed under RCW 9A.20.021 for the underlying conviction if it finds,
considering the purposes of this chapter, that the facts found are substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”). The Washington courts have
made clear that, while the existence of aggravating factors is a question of fact that must be
decided by a jury, whether those facts “are sufficiently substantial and compelling to
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The Elusive Distinction Between Questions of Law and Fact

Prior to Hurst, state courts routinely rejected the idea that weighing
sentencing factors could trigger the Sixth Amendment.320 As one court
explained, “a weighing of imponderables” is different than “a finding of
historical fact.”321 Another court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right
recognized in Apprendi “rests on the notion that the ‘truth of every accusation’
should be decided by the jury under a reasonable doubt standard” and that
“there is no ‘truth’ in the balancing of the proper sentence for the crime and the
defendant.”322 The prevailing view among these courts was that “‘the weighing
process is not a factfinding one based on evidence’ but is instead ‘purely a
judgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s) against the aggravator(s) to
determine . . . the appropriate punishment in the particular case.’”323
But the distinction between questions of law and fact is not particularly
clear. And that lack of clarity has, at times, watered down the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Rourke,324 for example, relied on the law-fact distinction in a manner
that appears to circumvent the doctrine.
The result in Rourke is difficult to defend. It is not consistent with either
the state statute or the state guidelines, both of which state that a defendant has
the right to a jury determination on the existence of “aggravating factors.”325
Neither frames the right in terms of facts that a court could use to support a
decision to impose an aggravated sentence. The case is also very difficult to

320.

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

warrant imposing an exceptional sentence . . . . is a legal judgment which, unlike factual
determinations, can still be made by the trial court.” State v. Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 202
(Wash. 2005) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S.
212 (2006); see also State v. Suleiman, 143 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2006); State v. Sage, 407
P.3d 359, 371 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). What is more, Washington law requires that judges
must enter written findings when imposing an exceptional sentence; oral rulings are
insufficient. See State v. Friedlund, 341 P.3d 280, 282–83 (Wash. 2015).
See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 94, at 561, n.118 (discussing cases). The question about
the scope of the Sixth Amendment arises not only in the allocation of decisionmaking
power between judges and juries, but also in the context of whether the weighing of
sentencing factors and other qualitative determinations are subject to the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. See Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 251 (Nev. 2011).
Carlson v. State, 128 P.3d 197, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 534 (N.M. 2005).
Nunnery, 263 P.3d at 252 (quoting Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151 (Md. Ct. App. 2003)
(collecting cases).
773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009).
MINN. STAT. § 244.10(5) (2016); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 2(D)(1), cmt. 2.D.102 (2017) (citing
Blakely).
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reconcile with Blakely v. Washington.326 Blakely involved a presumptive
sentencing system with a nonexhaustive list of aggravating factors, and the
defendant’s sentence was increased based on the enumerated factor of
“deliberate cruelty.”327 Indeed, the state had argued that the statute’s
nonexhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors were not properly
understood as facts to be found, but instead were included in the statute as
“mere proffered ‘consider[ations]’ for the court ‘in the exercise of its discretion
to impose an exceptional sentence.’”328 But the Blakely Court characterized the
finding of “deliberate cruelty” as an “aggravating fact,”329 and it is difficult to see
how Minnesota’s “particular cruelty” factor is any different.
Perhaps most importantly, in attempting to separate pure questions of
historical fact, such as whether the defendant handcuffed the victim, from
mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether the defendant acted with
“particular cruelty,” the Minnesota approach treats sentencing factors
differently than elements of a crime.330 When elements present a mixed
question of law and fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
approach adopted by Minnesota in Rourke. Specifically, in United States v.
Gaudin,331 the Court held that a defendant was entitled to a jury determination
about whether a false statement he had made was “material.” The government
argued that materiality was a legal question, and thus defendants were not
entitled to a jury finding.332 The Gaudin Court responded that materiality was a
mixed question of law and fact, and it noted that courts had never asked juries
to “come forth with ‘findings of fact’ pertaining to each of the essential
elements, leaving it to the judge to apply the law to those facts and render the
ultimate verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty.’”333
Relatedly, an appellate court in Washington rejected a Sixth Amendment
challenge to the state’s structured sentencing system by relying on the law-fact
distinction.334 The defendant in that case argued that the Washington scheme
ran afoul of Hurst.335 But the court rejected the argument on the grounds that
the jury made the factual determination about the existence of aggravating
326. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
327. Id. at 299–301.
328. Brief for the State of Washington at 23–24, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
(No. 02-1632).
329. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.
330. See supra note 325.
331. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 512–13.
334. See State v. Sage, 407 P.3d 359 (Wash. App. 2017).
335. See id. at 372 n.86.
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circumstances, while the judge made “the legal, not factual, determination
whether those aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial and
compelling to warrant an [aggravated] sentence.”336
To be sure, the conventional wisdom is that juries make factual findings,
while judges make legal findings.337 But there has long been confusion about
the role of the jury in deciding issues that are not purely factual.338 Court
decisions in this area are far from uniform, and labeling determinations
“questions of fact” or “questions of law” tends to create more, rather than less,
confusion.339 It is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish between questions of
law and questions of fact. Some questions are easy: Did the defendant have a
gun? How much cocaine did the conspirators traffic? These are obviously
questions of historical fact, and they are questions that the jury must answer.
But other questions are more difficult: Did the defendant’s conduct create a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury to others? Did the defendant have a
reasonable belief that the victim was about to use unlawful force against her?
These questions require not just determinations of what happened. They also
require determinations that resemble legal judgments.
Even before Hurst, the Sixth Amendment extended to sentencing findings
that appeared to require not only a finding of historical fact, but also some
qualitative judgment. As mentioned above, the sentencing factor at issue in
Blakely v. Washington was not simply whether the defendant used a gun or
possessed a certain amount of drugs. It was instead whether the defendant “had

336. Id. at 371.
337. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing Facts After Booker: What the
Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth, 39 GA. L. REV. 895, 897 (2005) (“The maxim that
judges do not decide questions of fact and juries do not decide questions of law is probably
as old as the common law. Like most maxims, it is not true—at least not all the time.”).
338. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 96, at 1771 (“The ubiquitous distinction [between law and
fact], despite playing many key doctrinal roles, is muddled to the point of being
conceptually meaningless.”); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making
Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 994 (1986) (noting
that “nicely compartmentalized separations of law from fact . . . belie more complex
distinctions between the categories”); Monaghan, supra note 95, at 232 (noting that “the
‘vexing’ distinction between ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact.’ . . . has long caused
perplexity in such diverse areas as contracts, torts, and administrative law”).
339. See Colleen P. Murphy, Context and the Allocation of Decisionmaking: Reflections on
United States v. Gaudin, 82 VA. L. REV. 961, 968 (1996) (“[T]he Court muddied the waters
when it used the terms ‘question of law’ and ‘mixed question of law and fact’ without
explaining the analytic difference, if any, between them.”); Weiner, supra note 95, at 1876
(arguing that “[c]larity of thought is not advanced by debating whether” certain
determinations are “law-making or fact-finding, as commentators have done”). See
generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 96.
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acted with ‘deliberate cruelty,’ a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in
domestic-violence cases.”340 The sentencing judge held an evidentiary hearing
and made a series of findings about historical facts to make that
determination.341 But what constitutes “cruelty” clearly involved a qualitative
judgment, rather than a question of pure fact.
Despite some sentencing facts requiring legal (rather than purely factual)
judgments, if juries need to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors or need to
decide whether there are “substantial and compelling reasons” to increase a
defendant’s sentence, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine would
obviously expand. Previous Supreme Court opinions suggest that such
qualitative language bestowed discretion on judges,342 and the exercise of
judicial discretion itself does not violate the Sixth Amendment.343
Although it would represent an expansion of the doctrine, and although it
is not necessarily required by Hurst,344 applying the Sixth Amendment to any
finding required to increase a sentence, rather than simply findings of historical
fact, nonetheless makes sense. For one thing, it simplifies the question of when
a jury must make a determination. The dividing line between “questions of
law” and “questions of fact” is so unclear that many scholars have questioned
whether we can rely on the categories at all.345 Thus, if the Sixth Amendment

340. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300 (2004).
341. Id. at 300–01. Those facts included that the defendant “used stealth and surprise, and took
advantage of the victim’s isolation. He immediately employed physical violence,
restrained the victim with tape, and threatened her with injury and death to herself and
others. He immediately coerced the victim into providing information by the threatening
application of a knife.” Id. at 301.
342. For example, in Blakely, the judge could have issued a sentence above the presumptive
sentence not only if he found an aggravating factor, but also if he found “substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535
(2004). The state characterized the “substantial and compelling reasons” determination
that the judge was required to make as “a question of law.” Brief for the State of
Washington at 24, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632). The Blakely
Court appeared to share the state’s assumption that telling a judge to determine whether
certain facts represented a “substantial and compelling” reason to increase a sentence was a
discretionary decision properly reserved for the judge. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8
(“Nor does it matter that the judge must, after finding aggravating facts, make a judgment
that they present a compelling ground for departure. He cannot make that judgment
without finding some facts to support it beyond the bare elements of the offense. Whether
the judicially determined facts require a sentence enhancement or merely allow it, the
verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.”). The Court found a Sixth Amendment
violation only because the judge had to support that qualitative judgment with factual
findings. Id.
343. See supra note 233 (collecting sources).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 267–268.
345. See supra notes 338–339.
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were uniformly applied in the way we suggest, then there would be more
consistency among courts, and courts would not have to grapple with the gray
area of whether an issue is a question of law or a question of fact.
For another, applying the Sixth Amendment to all findings required to
increase a sentence is consistent with the formalistic approach that the Supreme
Court has taken in other Sixth Amendment cases. In those cases, the Court has
said that even if a legislature labels something as a “sentencing factor,” the
Court will treat it as an element if it is necessary to increase a defendant’s
sentence.346 During the guilt phase of a trial, courts routinely ask juries to make
findings about elements that are not purely factual. Asking a jury to determine
whether a defendant acted negligently or whether a defendant’s belief was
“reasonable” are questions that are qualitative, rather than factual. And courts
routinely reject arguments that elements can be (or are) legal questions that
judges can decide.347 If we take seriously the admonition to treat these
sentencing considerations as elements, then juries should make all of the
findings, including the qualitative determinations.
Put simply, if we read Hurst to shift the Sixth Amendment inquiry from
factual findings to any finding that is required to increase a sentence, then the
Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine would be simpler and more
conceptually coherent. And we are not the only ones to have read Hurst in this
way. When the Delaware Supreme Court recently struck down its capital
sentencing system, several justices indicated that they believed Hurst
prohibited not only sentencing increases based on required judicial factfinding,
but also based on required judicial weighing.348
Before Hurst, Delaware required two separate capital sentencing phases.
In the first phase, a jury determined whether any statutory aggravating
circumstances existed.349 If the jury found aggravating factors, then the
defendant was eligible for the death penalty.350 At the second stage, the jury
decided whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating

346. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 114 (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 494 n.19 (2000).
347. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (holding that a jury must determine
whether a defendant’s false statement was “material”); United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d
220 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a jury must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt,
whether the defendant’s conduct affected, or would have affected, interstate commerce);
see also Kamin & Marceau, supra note 94, at 562–64.
348. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d. 430 (Del. 2016).
349. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209(c)–(d) (2015), declared unconsitutional by Rauf, 145
A.3d.
350. See id.

516

66 UCLA L. R EV. 448 (2019)

circumstances, and that information was conveyed to the judge.351 The judge
then made her own determination about which aggravating and mitigating
factors were present and whether the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors.352 The judge also made the final decision whether to impose
the death penalty.353
Because the judge had to make her own determination about the presence
of aggravating factors, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware
capital scheme was unconstitutional after Hurst.354 All of the justices rejected
the “authorization” or “eligibility” argument, which is discussed in Part III,355
but several Justices also expressed concern that the judge was required to
conduct an independent weighing.356 Those justices interpreted Hurst to
require a jury to find both aggravating factors and weigh the evidence.357
Those Delaware justices are the exception, rather than the rule. State
courts have repeatedly rejected Sixth Amendment challenges to their sentencing
schemes. Those courts have characterized the weighing of sentencing factors
and other qualitative judgments as related to the ultimate sentence question.
For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a Sixth Amendment
challenge to the portion of its capital sentencing scheme that instructed judges
to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and to determine whether a
sentence of death would be “excessive or disproportionate” before deciding
whether to impose the death penalty.358 The Court distinguished between these
findings, which it characterized as “part of the ‘selection decision’ in capital
sentencing,” and the finding of aggravating factors, which it characterized as
“the eligibility determination.”359 The Court concluded that while the latter
determination triggered the right to a jury under Apprendi, the former did not.360

See id.
See id.
See id.; Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 320 (Del. 2003).
Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d. 430 (Del. 2016). See Erik Eckholm, Delaware Supreme Court Rules
State’s Death Penalty Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/03/us/delaware-supreme-court-rules-states-death-penalty-unconstitutional.html.
355. Rauf, 145 A.3d. at 433–34.
356. Id.
357. In concurring, Chief Justice Strine wrote:
351.
352.
353.
354.

But, I am reluctant to conclude that the Supreme Court was unaware of the
implications of requiring ‘a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to
impose a sentence of death.’ If those words mean what they say, they extend
the role of a death penalty jury beyond the question of eligibility.

Id. at 464 (Strine, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 U.S. 616, 619 (2016)).
358. State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 622–23 (Neb. 2003).
359. Id. at 626–27.
360. Id.
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As discussed in detail above, there is no right to have a jury select the
ultimate sentence.361 But weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, as well
as other qualitative determinations, is distinguishable from the ultimate
selection of a sentence. So long as judges choose to engage in that weighing of
their own accord, and so long as the statute does not limit their discretion to
impose a sentence by a particular outcome of the weighing, then the judicial
determination does not trigger the Sixth Amendment. And focusing on
whether statutory requirements limit judicial discretion, rather than whether a
particular requirement is a factual question, provides both consistency with
previous doctrine and an administrable standard.
Nor is there any reason to think that a jury is not equipped to engage in
weighing or to make these qualitative determinations. Courts routinely
instruct juries to weigh conflicting evidence introduced at trial when making
decisions about a defendant’s guilt.362 And several jurisdictions assign these
determinations to juries in their death penalty systems.363
Put simply, if Hurst expands the Sixth Amendment beyond factual
findings to other findings, it still takes seriously the initial constraints of
Apprendi. The Sixth Amendment applies when legislatures limit judicial
discretion by requiring certain findings in order to impose certain sentences. If
states do not limit judicial discretion, then no jury is necessary for those
findings. In this way, Hurst does not upset the rule that the Sixth Amendment
does not create a right to jury sentencing; it merely continues to impose a jury
requirement when legislatures remove sentencing discretion from judges.
C.

A Possible Additional Application: Juvenile Life Without Parole

Recent Supreme Court cases have placed significant restrictions on the
imposition of life without parole (LWOP) sentences for juveniles. Graham v.
Florida364 prohibited LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
crimes, and Miller v. Alabama365 prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for

361. See discussion supra Subpart I.B.
362. See, e.g., United States v. Twomey, 884 F.2d 46, 52–53 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing and
affirming trial court’s instructions to jury about how to weigh inconsistencies in the
evidence at trial); United States v. Nelson, 847 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that
the trial “jury was generally instructed that it was to weigh the evidence and that it could
‘accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.’”).
363. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(7)(b) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(C) (West
2018).
364. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
365. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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juveniles.366 These decisions indicate that juveniles and juvenile LWOP
sentences are different from other noncapital sentences, and thus the Eighth
Amendment restricts the imposition of such sentences on juveniles.367 In
particular, as the Court explained in Miller, even a child who commits a
heinous crime might still undergo rehabilitation and change in a meaningful
way. To this end, the Court emphasized the need to consider a juvenile
offender’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences.”368
The Court reaffirmed the general inappropriateness of juvenile LWOP
sentences in Montgomery v. Louisiana,369 which held that the decision in Miller
applied retroactively.370 In explaining its retroactive application, the
Montgomery Court stated that a LWOP sentence is unconstitutionally excessive
for all but “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.”371
This language from Miller and Montgomery may create a jury right at
resentencing under the Sixth Amendment after Hurst.372 When resentencing
offenders who received mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences prior to Miller,
several state courts have used the language from Montgomery as a standard for
assessing whether the new sentence should be LWOP or something less severe.

366. Id.
367. See William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053 (2013)
(exploring the implications of expanding the differentness designation under the Eighth
Amendment).
368. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78. Some courts referred to these as “Miller factors” and require
their consideration. The Court’s full explanation is as follows:
To recap: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration
of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents
taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—
and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including
the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own
attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility
of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.

369.
370.
371.
372.

Id.
136 U.S. 718 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 734 (citations omitted).
Indeed, Missouri found that such a right existed after Miller. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232,
235 (Mo. 2013).
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Specifically, some state courts determine whether the offender is “irreparably
corrupt” and thus deserving of LWOP.373 But not all courts require such a
finding. Some only require that a judge have the opportunity to consider
mitigating evidence before deciding whether to sentence a juvenile to LWOP.374
And many states have simply banned juvenile LWOP entirely.375
The state courts that have made a finding of irreparable corruption a
requirement for a LWOP sentence at these Miller resentencing hearings have
created a Hurst issue. If courts are correct that Miller and Montgomery require
a particular finding—such as “irreparable corruption”—prior to imposing a
LWOP sentence, then that determination is necessary to impose the increased

373. See, e.g., People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (2016), vacating as moot In re Cowan, 419
P.3d 535 (2018) (finding Eighth Amendment requirement of finding of irreparable
corruption, mooted after legislature abolished juvenile LWOP); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d
403, 412 (Ga. 2016) (finding Eighth Amendment requirement of finding of irreparable
corruption); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016) (same); Landrum v.
State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla. 2016) (same).
374. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 268–69 (Cal. 2014) (“Miller discussed a range of
factors relevant to a sentencer’s determination of whether a particular defendant” is
irreparably corrupt); State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1216 (Conn. 2015) (quoting Miller’s list
of characteristics); Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 469 (Fla. 2016) (finding Eighth
Amendment requirement of irreparable corruption); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 412
(Ga. 2016) (finding Eighth Amendment requirement of irreparable corruption); State v.
Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555 (Iowa 2015); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74–76 (Iowa 2013)
(listing factors and stating that Miller provided “clearer guidance on the considerations to
be given in sentencing”); State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 256–57 (Minn. 2014) (stating that
“mitigating circumstances might include, but are not limited to,” the characteristics in
Miller); State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 237–38 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding that the
juvenile defendant’s life sentence was unconstitutional because ”the sentencer [must]
consider whether this punishment is just and appropriate in light of [his] age, maturity and
the other factors discussed in Miller”); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 962 (Okla. Crim. App.
2016) (quoting Miller and labeling three of the listed characteristics “important youthrelated considerations”); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (finding that
the judge could weigh the factors, but that a LWOP sentence for Batts was
disproportionate and violated the Eighth Amendment in light of the evidence considered
at resentencing); Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (stating
that “although Miller did not delineate specifically what factors a sentencing court must
consider, at a minimum it should consider” a paraphrased version of the listed
characteristics); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (S.C. 2014) (quoting the factors listed
in Miller); State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 69–70 (Utah 2015) (finding that the jury finding
of facts was enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment); Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 47
(Wyo. 2013) (quoting the factors listed in Miller and stating that those factors are “not
exhaustive”).
375. See, e.g., Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 13,
2017),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole
[https://perma.cc/6UY7-2UFQ] (reporting that twenty-one states have abolished juvenile
LWOP since Miller).
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sentence. Pursuant to Hurst, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the jury, not
the judge, decide whether an offender is irreparably corrupt.
The question of whether a person is irreparably corrupt requires more
than simply a finding of historical fact.376 It is an application of law to fact; it
requires a decisionmaker to find various facts about a defendant and his crime,
and then to make a judgment, based on those facts, about whether the
defendant is likely to rehabilitate or whether he is irreparably corrupt. That
factfinding, followed by qualitative judgment, is no different than what was
required in Blakely v. Washington, where the sentencing increase depended on
a judge finding facts to determine whether the defendant had acted with
“deliberate cruelty.”377
Whether the Sixth Amendment extends to the juvenile LWOP question
may ultimately turn not on whether the “irreparably corrupt” standard is
framed as a question of law or a question of fact, but rather on whether the
LWOP question is framed as a question of increasing a defendant’s sentence or
decreasing it. If Miller and Montgomery merely require that judges be
permitted to consider mitigating evidence before deciding whether to impose a
LWOP sentence on a juvenile, then the Sixth Amendment will not apply.378 As
the felony murder discussion above explains, the Sixth Amendment applies
only to findings that increase a sentence, not factors that decrease a sentence.379
But if Miller and Montgomery actually require judges to make an affirmative
finding before they may impose a sentence—such as a finding that a defendant
is “irreparably corrupt”—then that finding is necessary to the harsher sentence,
and it must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida expanded the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine. It rejected a constitutional distinction
between factual findings that “authorize” a sentencing increase and other
required factual findings. Hurst may also have expanded the doctrine beyond
findings of historical fact to any finding, including weighing sentencing factors
and other qualitative determinations.
376. See discussion supra Subpart IV.B.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 326–329.
378. Indeed, a number of courts have taken this approach in rejecting Apprendi challenges to
juvenile LWOP sentencing. See People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016);
People v. Blackwell, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444 (2016); Beckman v. State, 230 So. 3d 77 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2017).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 249–251.
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These expansions will have wide-ranging consequences on sentencing in
the United States. In the wake of Hurst, several state legislatures have amended
their capital sentencing schemes,380 and at least one state supreme court struck
down its capital punishment statute.381 But more change is almost certainly on
the way. Several capital and noncapital sentencing systems continue to rely on
a distinction between factual findings that “authorize” a sentencing increase
and other required factual findings—a distinction that Hurst rejected. And
many other states require judges to weigh sentencing factors or make other
qualitative findings, which may also be unconstitutional after Hurst.
Since the Supreme Court first recognized the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine in 2000, it has undergone several expansions and contractions. Hurst
not only expands the doctrine, but it may also simplify and improve Sixth
Amendment sentencing.

380. See supra text accompanying notes 124–129, 136–139 (discussing amendments to the
Alabama and Florida capital sentencing schemes).
381. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d. 430 (Del. 2016).

